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I. Introduction
When deciding first amendment cases, courts have historically balanced first amendment freedoms against other rights guaranteed by
the Constitution' or against the need for reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions. 2 The emergence of significant barriers of entry to

1. Judicial deference toward the first amendment has been substantial. Some like
Justice Hugo Black have gone so far as to hold that the amendment was absolute. See,
e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) ("[t]he
First Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value
bn freedom of speech and press by putting those freedoms beyond the reach of federal
power to abridge"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First
Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428 (1967); Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is
An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245. Others have stopped just short of according it
absolute status. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo,
J.) ("[o]ne may say that [freedom of speech] is the matrix, the indispensable condition
of nearly every other form of freedom"). It has been described as "transcedent,"
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), and as occupying a "preferred
place" in the constitutional framework, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
Nevertheless, the need to balance the amendment against other constitutional
values has been recognized by most. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The absolute v.
balancing argument can be sampled in the Mendelson-Frantz debate. See Mendelson, On the Meaning of the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 40 CALIF.
L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J.
(1962); Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial
Process:A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964). For a list of values that
have been weighed against the Amendment, see note 91 infra.
2. The Supreme Court has recognized that at times "various methods of the
speech, regardless of their content may frustrate legitimate governmental goals."
Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). Therefore,
the Court has permitted "reasonable time, place and manner regulations [of speech]
that serve a significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels
for communication." Id. at 535. "[A] restriction that regulates only the time, place or
manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is reasonable . . . . [However], a
constitutionally permissible time, place or manner restriction may not be based upon
either the content or subject matter of the speech." Id. at 536. See also the discussion
of time, place and manner restrictions in Note, Access to State-owned Communications Media-The Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1410, 1421 n.44
(1979).
In the judicial review of time, place and manner restrictions the issues of vagueness
and overbreadth also are considered. Although they gain greater prominence in first
amendment cases, these considerations are more general in nature and not peculiar to
first amendment doctrine. Generally, vagueness and overbreadth conflict with due
process standards. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939)
(vagueness violates due process of law; life, liberty and property cannot be taken by
virtue of a statute whose terms are "so vague, indefinite and uncertain" that one
cannot determine their meaning) (reversing a conviction under a statute making it a
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the communications media, 3 however, has created a new situation;
the Supreme Court has been forced to consider competing claims of
first amendment rights. Those advocating a "right of access" 4 and
those advocating a "freedom to exclude" 5 have both laid claim to first

penal offense to be a "gangster"). Overbreadth may be challenged as a violation of

equal protection. See L.

TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 16-4, at 999

(1978).
3. Due to technological, economic and political factors, see notes 164-66 infra, the
supply of broadcast licenses is almost completely inelastic (i.e., the amount of goods
is fixed in amount regardless of price. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 377 (1980)).
The price of a license, which may be as high as $220 million, see BROADCASTING, April
5, 1982, at 36, has placed broadcast speech out of the reach of all but a very small
percentage of the population. Entry into the other mass media is not necessarily
easier. Although entry barriers in print and cable may be solely economic, they seem
sufficiently great to prohibit easy access by the vast majority of the public. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974) ("[economic and technological changes have] place[d] in a few hands the power to inform the American

people and shape public opinion");

MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97th CONG., 1ST SESs., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION:
THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 307-90 (Comm.
Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See generally B. COMPAINE, WHO

OWNS THE MEDIA? (2d ed. 1982) for a review of the major participants in each
medium; B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1975) for a discussion
of the economics of the media marketplace.
4. The seminal article presenting the claim of access was Barron, Access to the
Press-A FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). For a compendious
review of the literature see Kreiss, Deregulationof Cable Television and Problems of
Access Under the First Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1016 n.74 (1981);
Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media, 52
N.C.L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1973).
5. Claims of "freedom to exclude" have been asserted most strongly by present
media owners, their trade associations and their supporters in the government. In the
keynote address at a two-day seminar "First Amendment Values in a Changing
Information System," sponsored by the First Amendment Congress, on May 20-22,
1982, in Leesburg, Va., Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman
Mark Fowler "repeated and refined his position that all government controls-other
than 'traffic cop' enforcement-should be eliminated from electronic media ...
[including] removal of so-called 'content regulation' such as the Fairness Doctrine,
equal opportunities, reasonable access, personal attack rule, etc." Simon, The Future
of the First Amendment, Access, June 2, 1982, at 1. See Fowler & Brenner, A
MarketplaceApproach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 244-45 (1982).
At the National Association of Broadcasters 1982 Annual Convention, Senate Commerce Chairman Robert Packwood proposed that the United States Constitution be
amended to guarantee the right of free speech to the electronic media, as he feels the
founding fathers surely would have intended. See BROADCASTING, Apr. 12, 1982, at
30; CABLEVISION, Nov. 8, 1982, at 131. See also the position of the National Cable
Television in Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation
and the First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577 (1981) (cable operators have the
same status as newspaper publishers).
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amendment protection thereby creating great discord in the legal
community. 6
The Court presently permits reasonable regulation of access in the
broadcasting media; it nevertheless allows print publishers to foreclose
such access. 7 Although this approach has been praised by some,8 such
a doctrine can only survive if there is a clear distinction between the
print and broadcast media. In today's rapidly developing communications industry, the distinction between these converging media is unstable and inadequate." The increasing significance of cable television
in particular has created a pressing need to replace the fragile double
standard with a unified, all encompassing theory."
6. As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted: "The clear failure of the 'technological
scarcity' argument as applied to cable television amounts to an invitation to reconsider the tension between the Supreme Court's radically divergent approaches to the
print and electronic media." L. TMBE, supra note 2, § 12-22, at 699. See also Karst,
Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 4352 (1975) (applying the equal protection principle to access to the media); Van
Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29
S.C.L. REV. 539, 547 n.49 (1978) for a partial listing of the extensive literature on the
Red Lion and Tornillo cases.
Both Kreiss, supra note 4, at 1001, and Note, The Right to Receive Information
and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protectionfor the Communication
Process, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1979) suggest ways to administer a balancing test of
rights of access versus rights to exclude, but this Article attempts to finesse any such
need.
7. Government controlled publications cannot foreclose such access. See note 149
infra.
8. Professor Lee Bollinger celebrates the advantages of a two-tiered approach to
the media similar to that adopted by the Court. He observes that such an approach
permits the print media to remain an unregulated check on government while
permitting access seekers to enjoy some access. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press
and Public Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 U.
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
9. The convergence of the print and broadcast media may be best exemplified by
the 100 local newspapers which provide continuous news presentations on cable
television channels. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6. It is unclear whether
this use of broadcast technology should subject publishers to regulation. In fact, most
traditional newspapers use broadcasting technologies when they use international
phone service and some use satellites to relay their edition to printing presses throughout the nation. See Mueller, Property Rights in Radio Communication: The Key to
Reform of Telecommunications Regulation, at 47 n.18 (CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 1982).
Recognizing that "[t]he line between print and electronic journalism is thin at best
and getting thinner," New York Times Publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger has advocated a repeal of the broadcast "fairness doctrine," N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1982, at B4,
col. 5, apparently in fear that acceptance of such regulations might encourage their
imposition on print publishers sometime in the future. For a discussion of the fairness
doctrine, see notes 15-18 infra and accompanying text.
10. "[T]here has been persistent pressure for a unitary First Amendment theory
that would embrace both the print and electronic media .. .[as part of] 'the quest
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This Article proposes such a unified theory after first drawing the
crucial distinction between first amendment rights-which shield
messages-and rights held by media owners-which are merely property rights protected by the fifth amendment.' Once message and
medium are clearly distinguished, the first amendment's protection of
the free flow of information through our system of communication
may be seen in a new and more meaningful light.
Before presenting the theory, it is useful to understand the tension
which has been created in first amendment mass media doctrine by
recent case law.1 2 As Professor Laurence Tribe has observed, "the
development of the law in this area is simpler to summarize than to
13
comprehend.'

II. Access Seekers v. Media Owners
The first case which forced the Court to weigh the rights of access
seekers against the rights of media owners (who claimed the right to4
restrict access selectively) was Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC.'
In that 1969 decision, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's "fairness doctrine.' 5 This congressionallyfor coherent general theory in matters of the First Amendment.' " B. SCHMIDT,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 4 (1976) (quoting H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1965)). See note 6 supra. The current chairman of the
FCC favors removal of "content regulation" such as the fairness doctrine. See note 5
supra. Such removal would unify the application of the first amendment to the print
and electronic media by not imposing regulation on either medium. However, this
result would deny those seeking access any wedge for gaining entry to the electronic
medium. See remarks of L. Tribe and B. Schmidt in BROADCASTING, May 31, 1982, at
55.
11. The distinction was recognized in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980). See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-22, at 696, discussing
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) ("[t]he Hudgens Court made it clear that the
NLRB could compel the shopping center owner to let picketers in, a position incompatible with the view that the owner's refusal rests on a first amendment base"). The
two constitutional rights are often combined in one entity but one's property rights
are not enlarged simply because one is in the media. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1979) ("a property interest in a means of communication does not
enlarge or diminish the First Amendment protection of that communication"); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937); see also note 47 infra for a discussion of the
protection that the fifth amendment affords to property rights.
12. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
13. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-22, at 698.
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
15. Id. at 400-01. "[T]he fairness doctrine is the name given to two requirements
applied by the Federal Communications Commission to radio and television broad-
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authorized 16 and FCC-established1 7 policy requires broadcast licensees
to devote a reasonable amount of time to controversial issues of public

importance and to afford adequate opportunity for the presentation of
opposing viewpoints on these issues.18 Recognizing that "as far as the
First Amendment is concerned, those who are licensed stand no better
than those to whom licenses are refused,"' 9 the Court accepted the
fairness doctrine as a reasonable compromise between the free speech
rights of those who had been granted licenses and those to whom
2
licenses had been denied. 1
casters . . . . The first ... demands that broadcast licensees devote a reasonable
amount of their programming to controversial issues of public importance. The
second ...requires that when such issues are presented, contrasting views on them
be aired." S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 9 (1978). See note 17
infra.
16. Under 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976) the Federal Communications Commission
"from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall
[m]ake such rules and regulations, and prescribe such restrictions and conditions...
...
When granting
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
licenses, the FCC is required to consider the demands of public interest. See id. §§
307(a), 309(a).
17. The fairness doctrine evolved through a number of decisions handed down by
the FCC. One of the first cases dealing with the doctrine was Great Lakes Broadcasting, Federal Radio Commission, Third Annual Report 32 (1929). In Great Lakes, the
Federal Radio Commission (FRC) (predecessor to the FCC) held that public interest
required ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views and that the
principle applied to all discussion of issues of importance to the public. In Trinity
Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932)
and Young Peoples Ass'n for Propagation of Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938), the FRC
and FCC enforced the requirement of free and fair competition of opposing viewpoints by threatening to deny licenses to those who did not comply. The doctrine was
further refined by a series of cases which include Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8
F.C.C. 333 (1940); United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); New Broadcasting Co., 6 RAD. REG. (P & F) 258 (1950); Cullman Broadcasting, 25 RAD. REC.
(P & F) 895 (1963); Mayflower Broadcasting established that a licensee must cover
fairly the views of others. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). United Broadcasting held that
broadcasters must give adequate coverage to public issues. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
Under the New Broadcasting decision, coverage must be fair in that it accurately
reflects opposing views. 6 RAD. REG. (P & F) 258 (1950). In Cullman Broadcasting,
the Commission determined that such coverage must be done at broadcasters' own
expense. 25 RAD. REG. (P & F) 895 (1963). The doctrine has been codified at 47
C.F.R. § 1212 (1981). See also S. SIMMONS, supra note 15, for a more detailed
discussion of the fairness doctrine and its history.
18. See note 17 supra.
19. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389. See generally Karst, supra note 6 (discussing such
an equal protection principle).
20. The Court recognized that where "100 persons want broadcast licenses .. .
there . . . may be only 10 frequencies to allocate. [All of those persons] may have the
same 'right' to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio,
only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves." Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388-89. "Because of [this] scarcity ... the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
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Four years later, in Columbia BroadcastingSystem v. Democratic
National Committee, 21 a divided Court refused to hold that those
without licenses possessed an inherent first amendment right of access
greater than the FCC-imposed fairness doctrine; 22 the first amendment did not require that all those wishing to purchase access time be
allowed to do so. 23 The Court deferred to the FCC's decision to rely on
the fairness doctrine compromise to satisfy the rights of non-licensed
access seekers. 24 It did not, however, decide whether the FCC could
have required broadcasters to sell commercial time for political adver25
tising.
A year later, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,26 a
unanimous Court refused to uphold a Florida statute 27 recognizing
first amendment rights of access for non-publishers to the columns of a

should be expressed ...." Id. at 390. The Court, therefore, accepted the requirement that "a licensee must offer to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast
time to those who have a view different from that ... already ... expressed." Id. at
391. The Court considered the fairness doctrine such a restraint. Id. at 391, 400.

21. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
22. Id.
23. The complainants argued that the first amendment principles of free expression required a broadcaster to sell commercial time to persons wishing to discuss
controversial issues. Id. at 122. The Court upheld the FCC's conclusion that the
public interest would not be served by such a system. Id. at 123.
'24. The continued reliance on the fairness doctrine would avoid "the risk of an
enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of
public issues," id. at 126, and "a continuing case by case determination," id. at 127,
which the FCC would be drawn into if the system advocated by the complainants,
see note 23 supra, would have been adopted.
In addition, the Court has recognized that "the Commission must be allowed to
'remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable "middle course" in its quest to
preserve a balance between the essential public accountability and the desired private control of the media.' " Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 390
(1981) (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,

120 (1973)).
25. Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1976)), now imposes special regulations concerning the broadcasting of messages by
political candidates. In particular, § 315(b) gives candidates preferential rates for
commercial time. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) for
the Court's discussion of the statute's purpose and the FCC's role in administering it.
This decision was foreshadowed in the comments of the majority of the Court in
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (Burger,
C.J.) ("[c]onceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission or the broadcasters may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and
desirable"); see also id. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 147 (White, J.,
concurring).
26. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
27. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1982) (repealed 1975). For a discussion of this and
similar statutes, see Bollinger, supra note 8, at 3 n.10, 18 n.57.
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newspaper which "assails" them.28 The Court prohibited such governmental "intrusion into the function of editors, '29 fearing that, "faced
with the penalties ... of the Florida statutes, political and electoral
coverage would be blunted or reduced .... It has yet to be demonstrated how government regulation of this crucial [editorial] process
can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment guarantees of a
30
free press as they have evolved to this time.
Thus, while the Court has accepted a fairness doctrine which 3re1
quires government scrutiny of the access decisions of broadcasters, it
has forbidden governmental intrusion into the access decisions of
publishers. In Red Lion, the Court justified this double standard with
a "scarcity" argument, 32 but this rationale has been severely discred-

28. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
29. Id. at 258.
30. Id. at 257-58.
31. This scrutiny is achieved by evaluating the performance of broadcasters at
license renewal time. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d), (e) (1976); Geller, The Comparative
Renewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REV.
471 (1975). Some have suggested that governmental scrutiny may chill the broadcast
press, see F.

FRIENDLY, THE GOOD

Guys,

THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

199-219 (1975); Douglas, The First Amendment and the Electronic Press, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 123, 135-37 (1978); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the
First Amendment, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 15, 20-23 (1967); Note, FCC Regulation of
Broadcast News: First Amendment Perils of Conflicting Standards of Review, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 1226 (1980). Only once has the agency even mentioned the failure
to comply with the fairness doctrine as one of the reasons for denying a license
renewal. See F. FRIENDLY, supra, at 83-85; Note, Broadcast Deregulation and the
First Amendment: Restraints on Private Control of the Publicly Owned Forum, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 529 n.89 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, BroadcastDeregulation].
In fact license revocations are so rare that in KWTX v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d
306 (5th Cir. 1959), the court affirmed a tax court decision disallowing a depreciation deduction for the cost of obtaining a three-year license from the FCC, noting
that the FCC "has never refused to grant a renewal of a license once it has been
granted." Id. at 407 n.1. Before 1969, the FCC revoked or denied renewal of only six
licenses: three were abandoned licenses, two were construction permits, and one was
for unauthorized transfer of control. See S. BREYEn, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 412
n. 17 (1982). See also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 209 n. 10 (noting the nearly
100 % renewal rate for licensees).
The FCC's present policy expressly includes a preference for the incumbent licensee as one of the many factors considered at renewal time, where the preference
"depends on the merits of the past record." Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d
993, 1012, 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1138, 1156 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Central Fla.
Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982). It has been intimated by the
Supreme Court that such a policy is permissible, FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 782 & n.5, 805-07 (1978).
32. 395 U.S. at 388, 390.
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ited 33 and the Court itself did not even mention Red Lion in its
Tornillo decision. 34 It is still possible to maintain the distinction be-

33. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunication Press, 1975 DuiuE
L.J. 213, 223-29; Bollinger, supra note 8, at 6-12. The best discussion of the "scarcity" issue is in Mueller, supra note 9, at 6-12.
Because all "goods are, by definition, scarce," see Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1959), it seems that what was actually meant
by "scarcity" was a fixed (inelastic) supply of broadcasting frequency bands, see note
3 supra. This inelasticity is allegedly due to a "physical" limit to the number of bands
available, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388, 390 (1969), but
this is not correct. The channel capacity of the spectrum is fixed only in relation to
the present state of technology, B. OWEN, supra note 3, at 91, just as the supply of
newsprint can be said to be fixed, given the current state of investment in the paper
industry. As the amount of available newsprint can be increased (up to some physical
limit) through greater investment in paper production, so could the capacity of the
spectrum be enlarged by economic investment in increasingly sophisticated broadcast
equipment, thus allowing a more intensive use of frequencies. Id.; H. LEVIN, THE
INVISIBLE RESOURCE 22-24 (1971); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 222-23. More
stations could be provided over the air if more precise (and expensive) timing equipment was utilized in transmission and reception of signals. The fact that such
technology seems prohibitively expensive today should not be surprising given the
incentives of licensees who pay no fees for their licenses and are almost guaranteed
automatic renewals.
In fact, those holding broadcast licenses have had incentives to discourage the
development of less costly technologies and block their implementation when developed. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 53-54 (1973); B. OWEN, supra note 3, at 92. Thus, when a technology was
developed which would allow the AM spectrum to hold about 10% more stations by
using 9 kHz bands instead of 10 kHz bands, the vested interests of broadcasters led
them to oppose such a change. See Mueller, supra note 9, at 5-6.
There are those who might say that the scarcity of stations is due to the substantial
investment required, but this is not the same as asserting that frequencies are physically scarce. Scarcity in this context is merely a claim that, in absolute numbers,
there are too few stations for one's taste, and that adding new stations seems too
expensive, Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 73-76 (D.C.
Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). By this reasoning, scarcity in the newspaper industry would justify regulation of the print media
for as of January 1980, there were 1745 daily newspapers, Editor & Publisher, 1981
International Yearbook, preface; and 9159 radio stations and 1062 television stations,
not including translators, BROADCASTING, Nov. 8, 1982, at 98.
The,District of Columbia Circuit Court explained in Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), however, that mere
economic scarcity is not enough to justify regulation of speech. "[S]carcity which is
the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even
limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the conventional
press. . . ."Id. at 46.
34. The failure of the Supreme Court to even mention Red Lion is particularly
odd in light of the heavy reliance on the case by the Florida State Supreme Court,
287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In fact, the Red Lion precedent
was the very center of the Tornillo briefs and oral arguments. See Van Alstyne, supra
note 6, at 546-47.
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tween print and broadcasting,35 but the "scarcity" rationale must be
replaced with a more meaningful contrast between editors selected by
the government and editors whose survival is solely the result of
success in market competition.3"

35. For a discussion of the justifications that have been advanced for applying the
first amendment differently to the print and media, see Note, Cable Television and
the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1017-25 (1971). One particularly
popular justification is that broadcasters are qualitatively more powerful than print
publishers ever were. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("the
broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans . . ."); Bazelon, supra note 33, at 220-21; Bollinger, supra note 8, at 1314; Hagelin, The FirstAmendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast-Cable
Controversy, 44 CIN. L. REv. 427, 432-33 (1975). But see Jaffe, The Editorial
Responsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 768, 770-71 (1972) ("the influence of television broadcasting on the public's
political consciousness should not be exaggerated; it is only one among many bearers
of experience"); Lange, supra note 4, at 21. One must also recognize that print
publishers have substantial influence over broadcasters. For example, Earth Day, a
rally staged by environmental activists, was a media event created initially by an
article in the New York Times. Harvard University Kennedy School of Government,
Steve Cotton and Earth Day, No. C94-75-062, at 12-15 (1975).
36. The difference between the rights held by government selected editors (e.g.,
broadcasters) and market selected editors (e.g., print publishers) is analogous to the
difference between the rights held by those using public land (e.g., parks) and those
using their own private land (e.g., front lawns). The former are required to share the
use of their property and grant access to others while the latter may exclude all
others. See notes 116-31 supra and accompanying text.
Since 1924, Congress, courts and commentators have regarded the radio spectrum
as the "inalienable possession of the people of the United States and their Government." 65 CONG. REC. 5735 (1924). A Senate Report on amending § 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934 noted that "broadcast frequencies are limited and
therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust." S. REP. No. 562,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2564,
2571 (emphasis added). Yet it seems clear that it is actually no more necessary that
the limited spectrum be owned by the government than it is necessary that the
limited supply of real property comprising the United States be owned by the
government. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 554-59.
Public policy has dictated that the government should own some real property
(e.g., public parks and streets). See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939) ("[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public .

. .

. Such use of the streets

and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens"). But see Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion in
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895) (private citizens have no inherent right to use public parks). However, most of the real estate in the country is
privately owned and allocated by price in the marketplace. It would be equally
practical to allow the portion of the spectrum presently used by commercial broadcasters to be privately owned while the government retained ownership of public
educational station licenses.
Detailed proposals for private ownership of the airwaves have been offered by a
number of commentators. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 33; Coase, Evaluation of
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In broadcasting, the government allocates a fixed number of de jure
exclusive licenses to a select group of recipients. 37 These licensees enjoy
not only free use of a valuable right, 38 but also protection from the
entry of others.3 9 Potential entrants are effectively prevented from
competing with the favored licensees even when they feel economically and technologically capable of doing so. 40 Although economic
Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic
Issues, 41 LAND ECON. 161 (1965); DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A
Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A LegalEconomic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969); Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 5; Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to
Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 221 (1975); Mueller, supra note 9.
Leasing channels to the highest bidders was first suggested by Leo Hertzel in "Public
Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802
(1951). But see Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum: Report on a
Conference, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 71.
Some have felt that private ownership would deprive most individuals of access or
service but when one contrasts the access and service provided by regulated broadcasters and that provided by unregulated print publishers, even former critics of a
marketplace solution have advocated private ownership. See Parkman, The FCC's
Allocation of Television Licenses: Regulation with Inadequate Information, 46 ALB.
L. REV. 22 (1981); Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay
on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 240-43 (1978).
FCC chairman Mark Fowler has recognized the distinction between regulated
public servants and unregulated private owners and has been urging broadcasters to
support legislation to transform their industry into a privately owned medium similar
to the print medium. Using a land metaphor, Fowler has asked broadcast licensees to
offer to pay to transform leases for government owned "apartments" into privately
owned "condominiums." Although broadcasters would like to be treated as owners of
private property they seem to believe that they can get private property rights
without paying for them. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 23.
To see that regulation is solely the result of the government's policy to retain
ownership of the spectrum, one need only imagine the hypothetical situation where
the government decided that all printing presses should be the inalienable possession
of the United States because of their scarcity. If licenses to use the public presses at no
cost were then awarded to a select group of editors, the first amendment would
presumably require that some kind of access rights be provided to those not selected,
see note 44 infra, presumably along the lines of the broadcast fairness doctrine. For
the view that the government policy of retaining ownership of the broadcast medium
actually violates the first amendment, see Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 560; Note,
Broadcast Deregulation, supra note 31, at 536-43.
37. See Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-315 (1976));
H. LEVIN, supra note 33, at 4-7, 52-55 (1971).
38. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101;
H. LEVIN, FACT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION 111-20 (1980).
39. See T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINEss 57 (1976); M. PORTER,
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 13 (1980). This right is similar to that created by the issuance
of a patent. "The grant of a patent-is the grant of a statutory monopoly." Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964). See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
40. For example, by exerting tremendous pressure on the FCC to reverse its initial
decision, present holders of AM radio licenses were able to block an agency proposal
which would have opened the door to a substantial (10 %) increase of new broadcast
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conditions allow most publishers to enjoy at least as much monopoly
or oligopoly power as broadcasters, 4' theirs is merely a defacto status.
The government does not designate any preferred class of publishers
for special privileges nor block new entry by others. New entrants may
42
compete with incumbents whenever they feel capable of doing so.
The Court's recognition in Red Lion that those refused licenses have
equal first amendment rights to those with licenses43 seems to require
that the government provide some form of compensatory access to
those legally denied a license to broadcast. 44 By contrast there would
not appear to be any governmental obligation to provide compensatory access in the print media 45 because no private publishers have
been denied special privileges.

licensees. This would have been accomplished by decreasing the size of the frequency
bands from 10 kHz to 9 kHz. 9 kHz bands, viable economically and in use throughout
much of the world, have been rejected because of the "tremendously high" administrative costs of change. See Mueller, supra note 9, at 5-6; HousEREPORT, supra note
3, at 378. A similar situation led the CAB to reject all 79 applications from companies
wishing to enter the domestic airplane industry between 1950 and 1974, see S.
BnEYE, supra note 31, at 205.
41. See note 3 supra.
42. See, e.g., the Ann Arbor [Michigan] Observer, discussed in P. SANDMAN, D.
RUBIN & D. SACHSMAN, MEDIA: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MASS
COMMUNICATIONS

238 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as P.

SANDMAN].

43. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
44. Otherwise the awarding of licenses would amount to favoring some speakers
over all others as rejected in Red Lion. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court's rejection of plaintiff's claim of a first
amendment right to purchase advertising came only in deference to the FCC's
imposition of a compensatory fairness doctrine. See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456,
462 (4th Cir. 1973) ("strong arguments" supported a policy of requiring the columns
of a state subsidized college newspaper to be open to the expression of opposing
views); Kreiss, supra note 4, at 531. For a cable operator to be free of regulation,
California laws require the operator to observe a kind of public access fairness
doctrine. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066.1(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982). A cable operator
must offer community service channels. Id. § 53066.1(d). This statute includes a
requirement that 50o per subscriber be paid on an annual basis to an association of
cable operators which provides a number of community services. Id. § 53066.1

(d)(3).
45. "The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the
power of the licensor ....
[T]he liberty of the press became initially a right to
publish without a license what formerly could be published only with one." Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (footnote omitted). Thus, courts have
consistently held that there is no inherent first amendment right of speakers to gain
access to newspapers. See, e.g., Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1971); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Publishing Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
973 (1971); Person v. N.Y. Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 573
F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); Burke v. Kingsport Publishing Corp., 377 F. Supp. 221,
222 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 932 (1974); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc.
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While this distinction between government-chosen and market-chosen monopolists appears to reconcile the Court's decisions, 46 it does not
address the broader issue of monopoly power-whether it be due to
economic or legal factors or whether in the print, broadcast, cable, or
live media-the danger that media monopolists will exercise their
market power to censor messages that they find distasteful. As medium owners they are clearly entitled to their economic property
rights as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, 47 including the use of
their property to support positions which they favor. The Supreme
Court, however, recognized in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,48 that the first amendment does not protect a private medium
owner's right to restrict access to its medium when it is open to public
business. 49 Affirming a California Supreme Court ruling which inter-

v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971); Modla v. Tribune Publishing Co., 14
Ariz. App. 82, 480 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1971); Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5
Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1966), aff'd, 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d
241 (1968); Poughkeepsie Buying Serv. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc.
982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954); Wisconsin Ass'n of Nursing
Homes, Inc. v. The Journal Co., 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1979);
Lange, supra note 4, at 25-32. But see Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225,
31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919) (an Ohio lower court held that the dependence and
interest of the public in the community newspaper, particularly when it is the only
one, imposes the reasonable demand that the purchase of advertising should be open
to members of the public on the same basis). But see Sky High Theatre, Inc. v.
Caremer Publishing Co., No. 22820 (C.P. Champaign County), reported in Bloss v.
Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 74, 83, 145 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1966)
(refusing to follow Uhlman).
46. This distinction can be used for all government chosen monopolists such as
public libraries and school newspapers. See notes 121 & 160-62 infra and accompanying text.
47. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fifth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Thus, the
Court has recognized the property owner's right to exclude anyone from his property.
See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). The rights of a newspaper
publisher are "private business [i.e., economic property] rights," Chicago Joint Bd.,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470,
478 (8th Cir. 1970), which are protected by the fifth amendment and permit it to
exclude people from its "property." See PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
48. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
49. The Court interpreted the cases of Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)
and West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) as recognizing only
a limited first amendment protection for owners of business media. Such protection
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preted the state's constitution to prohibit shopping center owners from
excluding speakers from their private fora, 50 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the state law as a reasonable regulation of the economic property rights of the owner. 5' By thus recognizing that the government
can use economic regulation to enhance the first amendment rights of
access seekers, 52 the Court has provided legislatures throughout the
country with an opportunity to remove many of the economic barriers
to a free and open marketplace of ideas. 53 This Article will demonstrate that the implicit holding of PruneYard-thatthe first amendment protects messages and not media-suggests a unified theory of
the amendment which can be applied to all media. To do so, however, one must first draw the distinction between medium and message.

would include the right to "expressly disavow any connection with the message,"
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. Finding that "[a]ppellants are not ... being compelled
to affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view, and [that]
they are free to publicly disassociate themselves from the views of the speakers or
handbillers," id. at 88, the Court found no violation of the forum owner's first
amendment rights. See also Bazaar v. Fortune, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (per curiam) (recognizing the right of a university to disassociate itself from a
message), discussed at note 151 infra; Comment, Unconstitutional Government
Speech, 15 SAN DIECo L. REV. 815 (1978), recognizing that the protection offered by
Barnette and Wooley extends only where "there is a sufficient relationship between
the actor and the activity to convey a reasonable impression that the actor is asserting
the truth of the message carried by the activity." Id. at 821.
50. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), afj'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
51. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Noting that "neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute ....
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest .... " Id. at 84-85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934), citing Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949)). See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3179
(1982); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978).
52. "A legislature may require private individuals to make various economic
sacrifices in the interest of facilitating political or communicative activity, as in DayBrite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri (342 U.S. 421 (1952), upholding law requiring employer to give employees paid time off in order to vote)." L. TRIBE, supra note 2,
§ 12-20, at 688. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 3164, 3170-71 (1982) (permitting N.Y. State to regulate the use of property to
facilitate access to cable television); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) ("[the
legislation] is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but
rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. Thus [it] ...
furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values"); Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981).
53. The New York State legislature was permitted to facilitate tenants' access to
cable television, although the Court required the State to provide landlords with just
compensation for the property rights infringed. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
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III. Distinguishing Medium From Message
The separation of message from medium is easier said than done,
54
for in the real world, a message can exist only within some medium.
This Article, however, proposes two standards to help distinguish
between the pair. They are the "business/editorial" test and the "copyrightability" test. Although neither is dispositive, together they usually provide sufficient insight to permit one to distinguish between
those parties who can assert first amendment rights to messages and
those who are entitled only to the economic rights of the media.

A. The Business/Editorial Test
The first test to determine the applicability of the first amendment
involves identification of the decision maker. On close examination,

54. The medium/message distinction appears to be the one most relevant for an
understanding of the first amendment's treatment of the communications industry,
although three-stage models seem more useful for general purposes. In the latter
models, this author suggests that information can be seen as going through three
stages:
First, the information is gathered and composed. Reporters, artists, novelists, and
researchers are some of the many contributors who selectively create, discover and/or
capture the raw data. Editors, directors and advertising agencies are some of those
who then exercise editorial discretion in an effort to effectively serve the needs or
desires of the general public or a particular target audience. It should be noted that
this group earns copyrights for their work and is protected from government interference by the first amendment.
In the second stage, information is packaged and marketed by business managers,
publishers, producers, and networks. They usually make their products more economically attractive to consumers by combining news content and advertising messages into single packages which are then subsidized by advertisers. As mere marketers of editorial and advertising copy this group does not earn copyrights for their
work (although they may own the copyrights created by stage 1 workers) and the
business decisions they make concerning distribution are not protected by the first
amendment.
The third stage is distribution. Book stores, data terminals, the postal service, and
broadcast transmitters and receivers are a few of the many conduits through which
information is transmitted to consumers. This stage is the one most affected by
technological developments and is the one changing most rapidly. See B. OWEN,
supra note 3, at 12-13; CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, chap. 2, 4-5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WHITEHEAD REPORT].
Most media organizations act in more than one stage and such expansion into
another stage is called vertical integration. Although there is a normally healthy
competition in stage 1, there may be entry barriers to stages 2 and 3 (e.g., the
expensive licenses required for broadcasting, see note 3 supra, or the natural monopoly characteristics of cable television distribution, see note 234 infra). As a result of
the entry barriers at stages 2 and 3, one firm may enjoy monopoly control. As a stage
2 publisher, it may favor dissemination of its own product over those of its competitor. A stage 3 distributor could act in similar fashion. See B. OWEN, supra note 3, at
13-16; WHITEHEAD REPORT, supra, chap. 2, 5-6.
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the amendment appears to protect only decisions made by editors
(regarding messages), 55 not those made by media owners and their
business staffs (concerning the use of the medium).56 While there is
often substantial overlap between business and editorial decisions,
there are usually enough recognizable factors present to permit them
to be identified as either editorial or business decisions. 57 Although
economic realities usually deny editors the opportunity to enjoy complete freedom from business staff pressures, the Tornillo case held that
the first amendment was meant as an absolute prohibition against
government intrusion into such editorial decisions.
This same prohibition clearly does not apply to government interference with business decisions. Although the first amendment pro58
tects media business owners from being regulated out of existence, it
55. See notes 73-83 infra and accompanying text. The editorial staff is responsible
for creating, developing, editing, and producing messages. Ideally, these messages
are selected for inclusion in the medium's message package based solely on their
"quality" or value to the target audience, P. SANDMAN, supra note 42, at 86-87, even
if they may offend an advertiser or anger a segment of buyers. Id. at 137-48. While
editors are subject to at least some implicit pressure to avoid antagonizing advertisers
or their audience, most editorial staffs strive to maintain complete control over
content (and their editorial integrity and credibility) despite business staff pressure.
Id. at 104, 137-48. Even when their message is purely entertainment, although still
protected by the first amendment, see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981) (live adult entertainment is not unprotected by the first amendment);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948), writers, directors, and other artists will often fight for the right
of final approval over their work so that others cannot transform their artistic and
editorial creations into more commercially marketable products. See, e.g., Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs, a group of
British performers called Monty Python, sought to restrain defendant from broadcasting edited versions of programs written and performed by plaintiffs).
56. A similar distinction was suggested by Circuit Judge Goldberg, dissenting in
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1087 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
57. Media organizations often insulate their editorial departments from business
staff pressures. See P. SANDMAN, supra note 42, at 127. This is done normally to
maintain the credibility of the editorial content. Id. at 137-48. While the separation
is often sufficient to permit decisions to be identified as either editorial or business, it
is rarely as clear as an organizational chart may show. When faced with this distinction in Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 495 F. Supp. 649, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), the district court judge noted that the three networks' decision to produce all
of their new and documentary programs in-house was "editorial as well as economic
innature . . ..[A]t least at this juncture, the challenged conduct has not been shown
to be so purely editorial in nature as to exclude it from the reach of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 661-62.
58. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) for the Court's discussion of the recognized exceptions to the principle that
the press may be regulated by the government (threats to financial viability). See also
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972), recognizing that "a newspaper can be silenced as easily by cutting off its
source of funds, as it can by enjoining its publication" (quoting appellants' brief).
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does not exempt them from normal, non-discriminatory economic
regulation. 59 The business staff and media owners normally have the
right to print whatever they choose6 ° and exclude all else, but their
power to exclude is no greater than a normal property right, as
protected by the fifth amendment.' Their rights to exclude are no
broader than the rights of all business owners to: (1) choose those
goods, services or clients with which or whom they wish to deal and

59. The media are not exempt from non-discriminatory taxation, Girag v. Moore,
49 Ariz. 74, 58 P.2d 1249 (1936), af'd on reh'g, 64 P.2d 819, app. dismissed, 301
U.S. 670 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); labor
laws, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); equal employment laws,
Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees,
60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976); or antitrust laws, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945). There are, in fact, special cross media ownership rules, see Second Report
and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
Diversity in the marketplace is generally protected by the antitrust laws which
prohibit undue concentrations of power. The Supreme Court eloquently articulated
their application to the media in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945):
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be
read as a command that the government was without power to protect
that freedom . . . . Surely a command that the government itself shall not
impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom . . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution,
but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests (footnote omitted).
60. As the Supreme Court observed in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976):
It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement
of one form or another . . . . Speech likewise is protected even though it is
carried in a form that is "sold" for profit, and even though it may involve a
solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money (citations
omitted).
61. See note 47 supra. This dual role (editorial and financial) of the media is an
unarticulated premise in a number of court decisions. See, e.g., Edwards v. National
Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (a
newspaper acting as a conduit in its neutral reportage of accusation by a responsible
conservation organization is privileged from defamation); Capital Broadcasting Co.
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Farmer's Educ. and Coop.
Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (a broadcaster acting as a
conduit in carrying statutorily required political messages is entitled to absolute
immunity from defamation); see Kreiss, supra note 4, at 1024 n.100 (congressional
ban on cigarette advertising through any electronic medium does not implicate
broadcaster's first amendment rights, since the broadcaster as conduit has only lost
the ability to collect revenue from others for broadcasting their commercial message).
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those which they prefer to exclude,6 2 and (2) maintain and protect the
credibility that they have demonstrated concerning such choices.6 3
These rights are not of the same character as first amendment rights.

62. The Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to "the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 428, 438-39 (1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919)). In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F.T.C., 630 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) the court noted that "even a monopolist, as long as he has no purpose to restrain competition or to enhance or expand his
monopoly, and does not act coercively, retains this right." As the Supreme Court
observed in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) "[o]ne of the
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others." Id. at
82 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)). Business
owners decide with whom they prefer to deal by ascertaining the desires of a
particular target audience. They then develop the necessary expertise to serve those
needs, providing superior service to the targeted market segment. M. PORTER, supra
note 39, at 38-40; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 3, at 52-53.
Nevertheless, the antitrust laws limit the rights of owners of scarce resources to
restrict access to competitors. The Supreme Court has recognized the duty of such
holders of monopoly power to make the resource available to all potential users on
non-discriminatory terms. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49
(1963) (prohibiting the New York Stock Exchange and its members from denying
non-member broker-dealers access to some private wire services); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1945) (holding that the members of a newsgathering cooperative association could not block non-member competitors from
becoming members); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 410-12
(1912) (requiring an association of railroad companies controlling access to the sole
terminal facilities of a city to make them available to non-members on reasonable,
non-discriminatory terms). See also the right of access to cable systems, discussed at
note 221 infra. But see the right of access to newspapers discussed at note 45 supra.
When a monopolist does not restrict access to its resource to further its own
monopoly power, it does not violate the antitrust laws, see Official Airline Guides
Inc., 630 F.2d at 927, finding that "enforcement of the FTC's order [to require access
to be provided] would give the FTC too much power to substitute its own business
judgment for that of the monopolist in any decision that arguably affects competition
in another industry." According to Professors Areeda and Turner, even arbitrary
restrictions on access merely for social, political or personal reasons technically are
not violations of the present antitrust laws. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW
736, at 270-76 (1978).
Such arbitrariness, however, may be prohibited by more specific legislation. The
Robinson-Patman Act, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)) prohibits dealers in
uniform commodities from exercising discretion over the prices to charge similarly
situated customers. Common carrier regulations limit the discretion that can be
exercised by those designated carriers, see note 109 infra. Other access regulations
may also be constitutional. See note 148 infra.
63. Any goodwill that they develop from these efforts is recognized as intangible
property. See Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
Hanover Starr Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916)). Nevertheless,
the first amendment does not prevent the government from undertaking reasonable
regulation of this property. See note 59 supra.
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B. The Copyrightability Test
The second test to determine whether one has a message deserving
of first amendment protection is to apply the abstract concept of
copyrightability. Only if an action is or was capable of earning a
copyright is it a message and therefore protected.
According to section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976:
Copyright protection subsists ...in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device . .. 14
The work of authorship is the copyrightable action or "message" as
distinguished from the "medium" in which it is fixed. 6 5 It is therefore
the actions of authors or other creative individuals which are recognized as copyrightable messages while the actions of printers and
bookstore owners are recognized as mere business transactions. 6
Under the test, unoriginal expressions, including phrases from the
Bible or Declaration of Independence, are recognized as messages
even though they are not copyrightable because they were capable of
earning a copyright when they were original. Similarly, unrecorded
extemporaneous expressions, such as street corner speeches, are recognized as messages because they would be capable of earning a copyright if they were fixed in a tangible medium.6 7
This copyrightability concept is especially useful for illuminating
one particular aspect of the first amendment's treatment of message
and medium. Just as a medium owner who publishes copyrighted
messages may sue a copyright infringer "on behalf of"68 the copyright
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
65. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 685 F.2d 218, 223 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("[t]he copyright is in the programming rather than in the method by
which it is transmitted"); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.03(c), 2.18(f), at

2-31, 2-208 (1982).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976) states:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including
the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; ...
67. A copyright is earned when the message is "fixed in a tangible medium." See
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
68. It should be noted, however, that the phrase "on behalf of" is a legal fiction. It
does not mean that the publisher of a message must get a writer's permission to assert
the amendment on his or her behalf. Thus in New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971), the New York Times could assert the first amendment rights of
the writers of the Pentagon Papers even though those writers (the U.S. government)
had forbidden the publication of the documents.
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owner, 69 so may it assert first amendment rights "on behalf of" the
message writer against those who would attempt to stifle publication.
Such "derivative" rights allow a bookstore owner to defend an author's books against unconstitutional obscenity laws70 and a newspaper publisher to defend an advertiser's rights against libel. 7'
It is important to recognize, however, that just as a publisher has no
right to sue a copyright owner for infringement of the owner's own
copyright,7 2 bookstore owners and printers cannot assert derivative
first amendment rights to exclude authors, nor can a newspaper or
network assert such rights against advertisers or independent producers. The ability to exclude a message from a medium is merely an
economic right.
C. Judicial Recognition of the Message/Medium Distinction
A careful examination of the language used by the Supreme Court
in first amendment cases reveals an implicit recognition of the message/medium distinction. The protection provided by the amendment
in those cases has been limited to editorial (copyrightable) decisions
rather than economic or business (non-copyrightable) decisions, 73 although the Court, on occasion, has used the term "editorial" more
loosely. 4

69. Presumably the publisher would receive this right to sue as the beneficial
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
70. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
71. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed at text and
accompanying note 91 infra.
72. Of course a copyright owner could be sued if the publisher had acquired the
copyright from the owner.
73. See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972), decided by the district court for the District of Columbia, holding that
the FCC's ban on cigarette advertising did not interfere with any first amendment
rights of the petitioner broadcaster. Noting that "petitioners, themselves, have lost no
right to speak-they have only lost an ability to collect revenue from others for
broadcasting their commercial messages," the Court found that, "it is clear that
petitioners' speech is not at issue ....
Section 6 does not prohibit them from
disseminating information about cigarettes, and, therefore, does not conflict with the
exercise of their First Amendment rights." 333 F. Supp. at 584. See also Chicago
Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Publishing Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) where the court recognized the distinction
between first amendment rights and property rights.
74. The Court has at times used the word editorial very generally to include what
are presumably purely business decisions. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle
or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper ... constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control or judgment") (emphasis
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In the Tornillo case the Court observed that the
First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print media so far as government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and editorial content
is concerned. . . . [W]e have never thought that the First Amendment permitted public officials to dictate to the press the contents
of its news columns or the slant of its editorials.75

Quoting from PittsburghPress Co. v. PittsburghCommission on Human Relations,76 the Court went on to state:
Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on stories or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors...
[W]e reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial

judgment and to the free expression of views on these and other
77
issues, however controversial.

Although in its role as a seller of space or time, a media owner is
protected only by the fifth amendment, it may assert a derivative first
amendment right on behalf of its advertisers or syndicated columnists.
Such a right can only be claimed in support of these individuals' right
to speak, as in the cases of New York Times v. Sullivan 78 and Bigelow
v. Virginia.79 The first amendment does not allow the medium
owner-as a conduit owner-to exclude the messages of others. 80 As
the Court observed in PittsburghPress:
[I]s the conduct of the newspaper with respect to the employment
want ad entitled to a protection under the First Amendment?...
Under some circumstances, at least, a newspaper's editorial judgments in connection with an advertisement take on the character of
added). But see Wisconsin Ass'n of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. The Journal Co., 92 Wis.
2d 709, 713-14, 285 N.W.2d 891, 894-95 (Ct. App. 1979) ("[t]he degree of judgmental discretion which a newspaper has with regard to refusing advertisements is not
distinguishable, for purposes of first amendment analysis, from the degree of discretion it has as to the content of any other editorial materials submitted for publication").
75. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259-61 (1974) (White,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
76. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
77. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).

78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of New York Times v. Sullivan, see note
91 infra.
79. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (managing editor of a newspaper had sufficient first
amendment interest to challenge a state statute which prohibited advertisements
encouraging the procurement of an abortion).
80. A medium owner's right to exclude is purely an economic right, see note 11

supra.
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the advertisement and in those cases, the scope of the newspaper's
First Amendment protection may be affected by the content of the
advertisement. 8'
Nevertheless, recognizing that the decision by the plaintiff publisher was a business judgment rather than an editorial judgment, the
Court went on to hold:
As for the present case, we are not persuaded that either the
decision to accept a commercial advertisement which the advertiser
directs to be placed in a sex-designated column or the actual placement there lifts the newspaper's actions from the category of com82
mercial speech.
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that in their business
function, media owners have no first amendment rights to exclude the
messages of others. As it stated eloquently in Associated Press v.
83
United States:
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the
free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a
refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is
not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom
by private interests.

81. 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973).
82. Id. at 387. The use of the phrase commercial speech instead of the presumably
more accurate description "business judgment" seems to be indicative of the difficulty the Court was having with the commercial speech doctrine in 1973, three years
before it was clarified in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Prior to that decision, "commercial speech, that
is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience
...[or] speech proposing a commercial transaction," Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980), appeared to be unprotected. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 758. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Valentine, the Court refused to enjoin an
ordinance restricting the distribution of commercial advertising. It properly recognized that, as a medium for distributing advertisements, the distributor was merely
functioning as a business retailer with no first amendment rights, but rather subject
to reasonable economic regulation. Id. at 55. Unfortunately, the Court failed to
recognize that in his function as the creator of the message the distributor was
entitled to first amendment protection. The Court did not recognize this right to
protection until Virginia Board, where the Court held that even speech which did no
more than propose a commercial transaction was entitled to first amendment protection. 425 U.S. at 762.
83. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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IV. The Theory
Once message and medium have been distinguished, they can be
considered the software and hardware of the communications process,
respectively. This computer-age terminology can then be used to represent a new theory of the first amendment. The amendment can be
reinterpreted as guaranteeing three fundamental rights prohibiting
unnecessary governmental interference with messages: free access to
all output offered in the media (receipt of all information provided by
willing speakers); freedom to process that output (thought); and freedom to provide input to the media (access permitting expression of
one's thoughts) .84
A. Freedom of Thought
Freedom of thought is absolute. 85 It is a right to self-edit one's
personal values without governmental interference. The first amendment prohibits the government from interfering with the content of
84. Traditionally, courts and scholars have recognized that the first amendment is

at least a negative limitation on government action. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1947). Whether the amendment imposes any affirmative

obligations is less clear. See note 52 supra.
85. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("at the heart
of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as
he will and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State"); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57
(1976) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624) ("[n]o official ... can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion . . ."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (preventing the unlimited display of obscene material is not
thought control); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) ("[t]he assertion
that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts ... is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment"); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the rights of
conscience . . . will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand"); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (expulsion of school
children who had refused to salute the flag and pledge allegiance held to violate first
and fourteenth amendments); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)
("[f]reedom to believe ... is absolute.
); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, §§ 15-5 to 15-8,
at 899-913; note 1, supra.
It is clear that the Court has appreciated the consequences of this absolute status.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 n.7 (1978) ("[t]he absolute protection afforded
belief by the First Amendment suggests that a court should be cautious in expanding
the scope of that protection since to do so might leave government powerless to
vindicate compelling state interests").
This absolute status is consistent with the laws of criminal and civil conspiracy
whereby a defendant cannot be convicted for thoughts alone; an overt act is required. United States v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 1979); Nalle v.
Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913). It is also consistent with the Court's holding that
one cannot be committed to an insane asylum merely for one's thoughts, unless one is
dangerous to others. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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one's thoughts and thus represents a right to personal integrity in one's
mind.8 6 It includes the freedom to select any political, economic,
religious, or artistic value whatsoever (a right of inclusion)8 7 as well as
a right to reject any or all others (a right of exclusion)."" In the
marketplace of ideas one is free to choose according to self-established
standards and one's formulation of a "preferred personality" (a personal "software package" to one's taste) cannot be regulated by the
government. It was this personal prerogative of individuals to edit and
exclude messages of others from their own "software packages" which
was implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, where it was unanimously held that the
89
government must leave editing to editors.
86. See notes 87-88 infra.
87. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (free exercise of religion considered
a right of inclusion which could not disqualify a person from political participation);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) ("[m]ost exercises of individual free choice-those in politics, religion and expression of ideas-are explicitly
protected by the Constitution"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (the
States' broad power to regulate obscenity does not extend to possession of obscene
material by an individual in his own home). The government's employment decisions
can be influenced by such beliefs, but only when the beliefs are relevant to the
position. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) ("[i]f an employee's private
political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First
Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State's vital interest in maintaining governmental efficiency and effectiveness") (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
366 (1976)); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating statute
barring teachers from employment in the schools merely on the basis of membership
in "subversive" organizations).
88. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) ("[t]he First Amendment
protects the rights of individuals ... to refuse to foster ... an idea they find morally
objectionable"); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(newspaper's right to exclude letter to editor not subject to state regulation);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (school prayer); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (appointee
denied public office due to refusal to declare belief in God, held invasion of first
amendment freedom of belief); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
89. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decision made as
to limitations on the size of the paper, and content, and treatment of
public issues and public officials-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how government regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistant with the First
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Id. at 258.
If the Tornillo decision is interpreted in this way it no longer appears that the
Court's statement "is so sweeping that it is hard to believe that the Court could
possibly mean what it said." Karst, supra note 6, at 50. This freedom also prohibits
the government from favoring one set of beliefs over another. "If there is any fixed
star in our Constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
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B. Freedom of Expression and Receipt of Information
The unrestricted right to think becomes almost meaningless, however, without the right of expression and the complementary right of
receipt of information. ° A message can hardly be said to exist until it
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion," West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). But see
note 98 infra.
Such preference is usually litigated under the establishment of religion clause. U.S.
CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644 (1970) (New York
City tax exemptions to religious organizations held valid); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (state officials prohibited from composing official state prayer and requiring its recitation in state public schools); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(program permitting public schools to release students during school hours to attend
religious instruction held valid); Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979) (discussing the wider scope
of the establishment clause). L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-4, at 590, and Emerson,
supra note 52, at 801-02, have criticized the effort to extend the scope of the clause in
order to prohibit government from favoring one set of non-religious personal beliefs
over another.
Freedom of thought has been mentioned with respect to public funding of potential candidates, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discussed at note 52 supra) and
the use of mandatory union dues for political purposes, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); I.A.M. v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1971) (particularly
Black, J., dissenting, id. at 788); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 865, 877 (1961)
(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354
(1948) ("to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinion which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyranical"); the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, "drafted in 1786 by Thomas Jefferson, ushered through the legislature
by James Madison, and an important part of the 'generating background' of the First

Amendment"; B.

SCHMIDT,

supra note 10, at 31 (citing

DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN

HISTORY 125 (H. Commager 4th ed. 1948)). Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the
government is limited on such matters as identifying believers; see Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state statute requiring teachers in state supported schools to list
every organization they belonged to, without limitation, held invalid); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (upsetting convictions based on an ordinance which
banned the distribution of handbills which did not carry the name and address of the
author, printer, and sponsor); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (reversing a civil contempt judgment against NAACP for refusing to disclose
its membership list); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-23, at 707-08; the validity of
beliefs; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944), although sincerity can be
considered and personal beliefs may somehow be distinguished from political beliefs;
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454-560 (1971); application of beliefs within
religious association; Presbyterian Church of the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); or application of beliefs within
political association; see, e.g., intra party disputes over the seating of convention
delegates, Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-91 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972); Graham v. Fong Eu, 403 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1975), af'd, 423
U.S. 1067 (1976).
90.
Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker
exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication,
to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from the decided cases,
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has been communicated. The right of expression, however, is not as
broad as the right to think, because it may conflict with other rights
established by the Constitution. 9 ' By contrast, freedom of thought is
• . . Lamont v. Postmaster .

.

. Kleindienst v. Mandel,

. . .

[and] Procu-

nier v. Martinez.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S.
7,48, 756-57 (1976) (footnotes and citations omitted) (there are numerous other
expressions to the same effect in the Court's decisions). See also Board of Educ. Island
Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808-09 (1982) (action
contesting Board of Education's removal of certain books from public school libraries). For a more detailed discussion of the right to receive information, see
generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT
(1948); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1;
Note, supra note 6; Note, ConstitutionalRamifications of a Repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine, 64 GEO. L.J. 1293, 1309-14 (1976).
91. See note 1 supra. Some specific values which can conflict with freedom of
expression are: (1) national security and public order, see, e.g., New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the United States, in seeking to enjoin publication
of classified material failed to meet "heavy burden" of prior restraint justification);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent or lawless action and is to incite or produce such action");
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (preliminary
injunction granted to prohibit publication of magazine article containing restricted
data concerning the hydrogen bomb), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.),
motion for reconsiderationdismissed, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979); (2) personal
reputation, see, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (where member of the
press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to
reputation of public figure who is required to prove actual malice, first amendment
does not bar plaintiff from inquiring into editorial process); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (New York Times standard is applicable to private figure);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) ("[t]he Constitution
delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct . . . [by] requiring proof of actual
malice"); (3) personal property in creations or performances, see, e.g., Zacchini v.
Scripps Howard, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (broadcast of a performer's act may appropriate a substantial portion of the value of that performance); International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (enjoining INS from appropriating
the commercial value of AP's news by copying it from AP bulletin boards); U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, codified in U.S.C. Title 17 (copyright law); (4) personal
privacy, see, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff who is
not a public figure need not comply with New York Times v. Sullivan standard in a
libel action); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975) ("there is a zone of
privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect him
from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity"); (5) fair administration
of justice, see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (avoidance of
a tainted trial justified restraint of the press); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (first amendment does not afford news reporter privilege to refuse answering
grand jury questions); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-63 (Cox II) (1965) ("[a]
State may adopt safeguards . . . to assure that the administration of justice at all
stages is free from outside control and influence. . . . [Such safeguards do not]
infringe upon the . . . protected rights of free speech . . ."); Wood v. Georgia, 370
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absolute precisely because it does not conflict with any other constitutional right.
If expression of a message will not violate some other overriding
constitutional value, the message can be shared freely with others. To
do so, however, it must have access to a medium. 92 Freedom of
association and the right to the free exercise of religion have traditionally guaranteed such access, 9 3 but there has been controversy over the
rights of access to both government and privately owned media, as
discussed earlier. This Article will now offer a resolution of this difficult issue. The traditional categories of first amendment freedoms,
as separate
speech, press, religion, and association, will not be 9treated
4
whole.
unified
a
of
parts
as
guarantees, but rather

U.S. 375 (1962); (6) integrity of political campaigns, see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state statute prohibiting business corporations from
making contributions in order to influence voters held to violate first amendment
even though purpose was to prevent electoral process corruption); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Federal Election Campaign Act provision for disclosure, record
keeping and contributions by taxpayers held not to violate first amendment); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (state statute prohibiting publication of editorial
urging people to vote held to violate first amendment even though purpose of statute
was to protect public from confusing last minute charges); (7) public decency and
morality, see, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (use of "obscene" or
"vulgar" words in broadcast may be regulated by the government after the fact);
Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (municipality's licensing and
zoning ordinance concerning "adult" theaters held not to violate first amendment);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) ("obscene material is not
protected by the first amendment . . ."); (8) truth in commercial speech, see, e.g.,
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state statute regulating content of optometry
advertisement held valid). These values, in certain circumstances, may outweigh the
right of expression. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, §§ 12-2 to 12-36, at 580-734 for a
discussion of the ways government can "abridge" freedom of speech, based on the
impact of the speech (which Tribe calls "track 1" abridgements).
92. As Justice Brennan eloquently observed, dissenting in Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.:
freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right
to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forumwhether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective
means of communications, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed.
412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973).
93. "What the Court has recognized as implicit in the first amendment, and
therefore in the liberty secured by the fourteenth, is a right to join with others to
pursue goals independently protected by the first amendment-such as political
advocacy, litigation (regarded as a form of advocacy) or religious worship." L. TRIBE
supra note 2, § 12-23, at 702 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the right of free association
guarantees that individuals will be able to communicate ideas (i.e. messages) via a
medium (conversation, printed matter, meetings, house of worship) to others interested in similar ideas.
94. Although cases concerning religious beliefs are normally separated from non-

religious beliefs cases in law school textbooks, see G.
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C. Freedom of Access to the Media
All first amendment cases can be placed in one of three categories:
the absolute freedom to think, 5 the qualified freedom to express/
receive 6 and the qualified right of access to the media.9 7 Cases may be
decided under a simple procedure. If the case concerns the freedom to
think, it belongs in the first category and the first amendment acts as
an absolute prohibition. No governmental body can interfere in one's
choice of which messages to include or exclude from one's own soft98
ware creation.
(9th ed. 1975), (in which ch. 12 contains a discussion on freedom of expression
for such beliefs as political speech, while ch. 14 contains a discussion on free exercise
of religious beliefs, id. at 1040-1259, 1452-53), the task of distinguishing between
beliefs appears unmanageable. As Professor Galanter notes: "The Court has broadened its notion of religion to include all beliefs which are sincere, meaningful, and
paramount in the lives of their holders." Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United
States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 217, 255-64. See Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 358 n.9 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1969), all
discussed in L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6, at 826-33.
As for the historical differences between religious and non-religious speech, Professor Benno Schmidt has noted:
Some historical evidence suggests the founding fathers may have considered both freedom of expression and freedom of religious conscience . . .
to be based on an integrated conception of individual autonomy in matters
not appropriate for government regulation . . . . Moreover, Jefferson's
and Madison's concerns with political and religious freedom went hand in
hand, and there are hints in their writings that constitutional protections
of religious liberty have parallels with respect to political expression.
B. SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at 32. Still the Court recognized distinct historical origins
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n..127 (1976).
Some have claimed that the Speech and Press Clauses are separate and distinct. See
Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous
Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979). But the concept of a distinct and independent
press clause appears weak. See Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 77 (1975); Lewis, A PreferredPosition For Journalism?,7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595
(1979).
95. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 14-53 supra & 116-240 infra.
98. No governmental body can determine what views one must affirm in public.
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see note 49 supra. In fact, the government cannot
speak in support of one set of beliefs nor force citizens to subsidize such speech, unless
it is necessary to the performance of governmental duties. The ability of the government to speak has been recognized in Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). See T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980); Yudof, When Government Speaks:
Towards a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 863 (1979); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of
Official Partisanship,21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980); see also the limitations imposed by
the establishment clause, discussed at note 89 supra.
LAW
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If the case involves expression, then one must determine whether
the government has restricted a message because of its content. If so, it
belongs in the second category and the Court must decide whether the
restrictions are necessary for the protection of some other constitutionally protected value.
If the case involves restrictions on access to a medium/forum then it
belongs in the third category. The remainder of this Article will
examine this area in depth. It will be argued that not only does the
first amendment forbid the imposition of unreasonable regulations on
access to fora controlled directly by the government 9 or by users
selected by the government,10 0 but that the amendment permits, and
probably even supports,01 the imposition of economic regulations to
facilitate access to all media,10 2 including privately owned newspa03
pers. 1
Cases falling in the category of qualified right of access to the media
require courts to address two primary issues. 104 First, they must examine any legislatively imposed regulations concerning the scope of access to the forum.10 5 The presumption would be that all fora con99. For example, public streets and parks, see note 106 infra; public theaters,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); military bases,
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
100. For example, broadcasters, see notes 164-93 infra; public libraries, see note
121 infra; public school curriculums, see note 120 infra.
101. See note 52 supra.
102. Access to the individual media is discussed at notes 116-240 infra and accompanying text.
103. Regulating access to this medium, however, must be clearly distinguished
from regulating access to a newspaper's messages, which is absolutely prohibited.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See notes 139-51 infra
and accompanying text for a further discussion of this topic.
104. Different commentators use different terms when discussing the two issues
(i.e., scope of access permitted or viewpoints permitted). Professor Tribe distinguishes between regulations of the type of speech and regulations based on position
taken within any type. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-21, at 692. Professor Stone makes
this same distinction. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 99 (1978). See
also Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1123, 1143 (1974) (suggesting such a distinction).
Professor Emerson calls the two issues the macro and micro levels of consideration.
Emerson, supra note 52, at 813. See also Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public
Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L. J.
247 (1976) (discussing the inadequacy of the Court's decision concerning access to
public fora).
105. This is the question of type of speech restricted or the macro question, as
discussed in note 104 supra. The question concerns the suitability of limiting access to
a narrower scope of users than the general public. Clearly access to the oval office of
the White House could be limited to serve a compelling governmental function. To a
lesser degree a public theater might constitutionally "devote an entire season to
Shakespeare," Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 573 (1975)
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trolled by the government directly or by those selected by the
government should be open to all (as required under traditional public
forum doctrine) 0 6 unless the primary uses to which the public property is normally put require that some restrictions be made on their
use by speakers. 107 For privately controlled media, 0 8 the presumption
would be that the media owner could impose any and all limitations
on the scope of access to its forum unless its monopoly power became
so great that the legislature felt compelled to mandate some more
general expanded (e.g. common carrier) access requirements. 0 9 To
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) or "reserve its auditorium for productions suitable for
exhibition to all the citizens of the city, adults and children alike," id. at 569 (White,
J., dissenting), or devote a season to opera as discussed in Karst, supra note 104, at
254. Access to government property can be limited whenever such access would
threaten the purpose of the government function, such as security at a jailhouse,
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), and political neutrality at a military base.
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-89 (1976).
106. The doctrine of "traditional" public fora was first set out in Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) ("[s]treets and parks ...
have . . . been held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing ....
[U]se [of] the streets and parks ... may be regulated in the interest of all;
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience ... but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied"), and was further developed in such cases as Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
836 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1973); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39, 41 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1943); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939). See also Horning, The FirstAmendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE
L.J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1; Note, supra note 2, at 1415-31.
107. Professor Stone discusses the need for such a balancing of interests, see note
104 supra, which the Court has seemed to recognize, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 843 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), as does Professor Karst, see note 104 supra,
at 256.
108. That is, those media owned by individuals who owe their existence to survival in the marketplace rather than receipt of government license. See note 36 supra.
109. Normally, full economic rights to enter a market and exercise discretion over
whom and what to deal with are granted to all businessmen subject only to the
antitrust laws and Federal Trade Commission regulations. See note 62 supra. Nevertheless, if it appeared that a market would be most efficiently served by a single firm,
legislative regulation of entry and access could be justified.
Apparently feeling that competition would be wasteful and inefficient, the government restricted entry into telephone service, 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1976), see Walters,
Freedomfor Communicationsin INSTEAD OF REGULATION 116-28 (R. Poole ed. 1982),
and mail delivery, 18 U.S.C. § 1696 (1976), 39 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604 (1976), see
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 470
F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972); Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the United
States, 18 J. L. & ECON. 33 (1975), even though there may never have been a natural
monopoly in either.
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decide the validity of such legislative regulation of access for either
public or private fora, courts would balance the necessity or usefulness
of specialized scope restrictions1 ° against the availability of alternative fora."'
Assuming that the court had approved the reasonableness of the
scope regulation, it would still have to examine any legislative time,
When "natural" monopolies are recognized and entry is prohibited to all but the
designated monopolist, the monopolist is normally required to provide universal
service as a common carrier. The Communications Act defines a common carrier as
"any person engaged as a common carrier for hire ...." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
The circularity of this definition has led the FCC and the courts to redefine the term.
A common-carrier service in the communications context is one that
"makes a public offering to provide [communication facilities] whereby all
members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing . . . . A
common carrier does not "make individualized decisions, in particular
cases, whether and on what terms to deal."
FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (citations omitted). Originally
common carrier regulation was imposed on any business which held itself out to serve
the general public, e.g., modes of public transportation and accommodations. For a
review of the history and development of common carrier treatment and the conclusion that it was a response to market power in a service essential to the public, see
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 520-34 (1981); but
see Comment, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act, 48 U. CHI. L.
REv. 409 (1981) questioning that conclusion.
Statutory common carrier status has been imposed on local telephone and telegraph companies, United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 349
(1959); 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976), and the postal service has been obligated to
observe similar standards also. See note 136 infra. Satellites are also regulated as
common carriers, see note 189 infra.
110. Although restrictions on scope may never be absolutely necessary, their tremendous value often creates a compelling need for them, see Canby, supra note 104,
at 1133. Thus, Professor Karst, commenting on the need for editorial discretion by a
student newspaper editor, recognizes that "[n]early everyone would agree that a
newspaper without an editor would not be . . .so much a newspaper as a printed
bulletin board . . . . [A]n editorial function is necessary to carry on a 'real' school
newspaper ...." Karst, supra note 104, at 256.
In Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968), the Third Circuit, quoting the trial judge with approval, noted, " 'the
Editorial Board [of a state school's law review] must be selective in what it publishes. ' "Restrictions on scope are similarly necessary for school curriculums, see note
120 infra, public libraries, see note 121 infra, and live public fora, see note 118 infra.
111. The availability of alternative media for communication is a consideration
that the Court has recognized in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (no
requirement to allow political candidates to speak at military base where base
personnel were free to attend political rallies off base); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 827-28, 830 (1974) (no first amendment requirement to allow interviews with
specified inmates where inmates retained alternative means of communication with
outside world); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 846-47 (1974); Lloyd Corp.,
Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566 n.12 (1972) (surrounding public roads of privately
owned shopping center provided adequate alternative for distributing handbills).
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place and manner regulation' 1 2 that were imposed on the use of the
forum to insure that speakers could not be excluded because of the
3
viewpoints that they expressed."
To understand the full implications of this theory, it is necessary to
examine each segment of the communications industry individually." 4 Economic regulation of public and private media can be used
to facilitate access. Such regulation, however, must be carefully distinguished from those which intrude into the editorial content of
messages. The latter intrusions are absolutely prohibited by the first
amendment. "5
V. The Media
A. Live Media: Public & Private Fora
Access to public fora cannot be denied to any speakers on the basis
of' the viewpoints which they express."" This mandatory right of
access extends to all suitable government facilities," 7 although the
112. For a discussion of time, place and manner regulations, see Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("[t]he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are
reasonable' . . . . The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time"); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233,
251-52. This issue is the "viewpoint," "micro" or "position" issue discussed in note
104 supra.
113. See note 116 infra.
114. Differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the first
amendment standards applied to them, Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 n. 15 (citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
115. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). "If officials
can tell newspapers what to put into their editorial pages ... it is only a step to tell

them what to leave out." Z.

CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT

AND

MASS

COMMUNICATIONS

709-10 (1965). See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (citing Tornillo). The courts have recognized that the antitrust laws are not applicable to messages. See Levitch v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 495 F. Supp. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("it was not the intent of
Congress that political and other First Amendment protected conduct be within the
scope of the antitrust laws") (citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961); Missouri v. National Org. of Women,
Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980)).
116. "There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard ....
Selective exclusions
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). See also
Kalven, supra note 106 (proposing the concept of a public forum).
117. This includes both traditional public fora like streets and public parks, see
note 106 supra, and other government facilities suitable for communications, such as
public transportation terminals and vehicles, see, e.g., Chicago Area Military Project
v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975)
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scope (or type) of speech permitted can be limited for compelling
governmental reasons." 8 When the advantages of limiting scope lead
the government to delegate the duty to choose speakers to only one or
a small group of persons, selection of such delegates may not be made
on the basis of an applicant's political viewpoints,"" nor may the
chosen delegates abuse their delegated discretion by arbitrarily denying opposing viewpoints access to their forum. This kind of "fairness
doctrine" applies to school teachers, 20 library officials,' 2' distributors
(airport); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968) (bus terminal); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schools); Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442
(1st Cir. 1973) (school information distribution systems); Comment, The University
and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 132 (1966); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (public meeting of City Board of
Education); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theaters); Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam) (military
reservation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (State House grounds);
Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974) (welfare office); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440
F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1971) (public auditoriums). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (transit system held not to be an open space or public
place for which first amendment guarantees access for all). Still, Lehman has been
criticized severely, see, e.g., Karst, supra note 6, at 34-36, Shiffrin, supra note 98, at
579-81, Stone, supra note 104, at 95-96. Even Justice Blackmun, author of the
opinion, has since interpreted it to have turned on the "captive audience" problem.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975).
118. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (limits on political speech were
necessary to avoid violating the political neutrality of an Army base); Toward a
Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632
(D.R.I. 1976) (restricting use of Old State House was necessary to preserve its
bicentennial-related theme). See also note 110 supra (discussing the need for restrictions of scope).
119. An example of such a situation would be the selection of teachers for public
schools. For the sake of coherence, only a small group of teachers can speak with a
class. The group which selects teachers may not make its decision on the basis of an
applicant's viewpoints. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) (where an untenured teacher did not have his contract renewed,
he could still establish a claim for reinstatement if the decision not to rehire was
based on his exercise of first amendment freedoms); discussed in note 124 infra and
accompanying text.
120.
Implementation of the constitutional obligation of the government to
maintain an open system of public education involves the principle of
balanced presentation . . . .In essence, it requires that, in designing curriculum, adopting text books, prescribing classroom plans, and making
similar policy decisions, the school authorities must provide a fair coverage
of the information, ideas, opinions, and approaches to the subject matter
involved.
Emerson, supra note 52, at 840-42. See Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2806-07 (1982) ("[w]e have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education
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of government grants,12 2 and state university presidents. 12 3 Choices
must be made according to reasonable standards which can be applied
12 4
evenhandedly.

must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of
the First Amendment"); Note, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum
Material: Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485 (1979).
121.
Petitioners rightly possess significant discretion to determine the contents of their school libraries. But that discretion may not be exercised in a
narrowly partisan or political manner . . . Thus whether petitioners'
removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First
Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners'
actions . . . . In brief, we hold that the local school boards may not
remove books from library shelves merely because they dislike the ideas
contained in those books ....
Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2810
(1982); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976)
("[n]either the State ... nor the Board .. .could place conditions on the use of the
library which were related solely to the social or political tastes of school board
members"); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979)
(removal of Ms. magazine because of its feminist viewpoint violates the first amendment); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D.
Mass. 1978) (library staff could not remove student publication from the shelves).
122. See, e.g., Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 798 n.8 (1st Cir.)
("distribution of arts grants on the basis of such extrinsic considerations as the
applicants' political views, associations, or activities would violate the equal protection clause, if not the first amendment ..."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976);
Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (once a city had
given an artist a permit to exhibit his work in a public building, it could not revoke
the permit on the ground that the work satirized the mayor); Media and the First
Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 1052-64 (1972).
123. See, e.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) (requiring a
state university to pay an honorarium and travel expenses to a speaker whose invitation was withdrawn by the university president because of what the speaker might
say).
124. The evidentiary standard established by the Supreme Court in Mount
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) places the burden on
plaintiffs to show that unconstitutional motivations were a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the defendants decision. Once that threshold is met, the burden shifts
to the defendants and they must show that the decision would have been the same if
the improper factor had not been considered. See also Southeastern Promotion, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (rejecting "a system lacking in constitutionally
required minimal procedural safeguards"); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television
Comm'n, 662 F.2d 1110 (1981), aJf'd, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
bane) (Rubin, J., concurring) ("[i]f the state is conducting an activity that functions
as a marketplace of ideas, the Constitution requires content neutrality"), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983) (No. 82-1.185); Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632, 640 n.9
(D.R.I. 1976) ("[t]he most troublesome aspect of the limited public forum approach,
of course, would be the necessity to define the 'limits' of the forum, i.e., the general
purposes for which it is made available, with enough precision that it could be
applied even-handedly, without being used as a shield to cover censorship of expression that should fall within the scope of even the limited public forum").
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Owners of private media such as theaters, parks and shopping
centers have normal property rights which are usually sufficient to
permit them to enjoy exclusive use of their media. 2 5 Nevertheless, as
their rights are not of first amendment character, 2 6 the government
may regulate them to provide greater first amendment rights for
speakers. 121 If government regulations constitute a taking of property,
then the property owner is entitled to just compensation for the property taken.12 8 Further, if the owner of private property appears to
have a monopoly over a forum, as in the case of a "company town"'' 2 9
or a privately held primary election,1 30 the government may constitutionally impose common carrier type access requirements13 ' upon such
quasi-public monopolists.
B. Printing: Presses & Periodicals
Access to printing presses has not been a significant problem in
Anglo-American history since 1694 when England abandoned licens125. See note 62 supra.
126. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Media owners do have first amendment rights to disassociate themselves from the views expressed on their property. See note 49 supra.
127. See note 52 supra. Common carrier regulation might be imposed if, for
example, a legislature feared the power of monopoly movie theaters in small towns.
See note 109 supra.
128. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3171
(1982) discussed at note 53 supra; U.S. CONST. amend. V. Regulations permitting
labor picketing usually do not constitute a "taking." See, e.g., Central Hardware Co.
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-45 (1972) (property rights may permit exclusion of union
organizers); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). For cases discussing an employee's
right of access to an employer's property, see generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556, 571-76 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976); Holland
Rantos Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 726, enforced, 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977). Similarly, the regulations in PruneYard were not
considered to have reached the threshold of a "taking." PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 82-84.
129. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (where a town is privately
owned by a company, its sidewalks are similar to public forum so that the first
amendment requires the channels of communication to remain free).
130. Private property as used in this context is defined as the right to exclude
others from access to a particular forum. See notes 47 & 62 supra. In the case of a
privately held primary election, the owner of the forum where the ballot box is
physically located possesses the right to exclude. Id. Although the owner may delegate that right to exclude to a political party, the state has the power to regulate a
political party's exercise of such a right. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85 (1932)
("[w]hatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members-of the committee
has come to them, therefore, not as the delegates of the party, but as the delegates of
the State"). L. TRIBE, supra note 2, §13-23, at 790; Kester, ConstitutionalRestrictions on PoliticalParties, 60 VA. L. REv. 735, 766-67 (1974); Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1159-63 (1975).
131. See note 109 supra.
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ing of the press. 132 While some of the original thirteen colonies had
34
inhibiting press laws, 33 none survived the Constitution.
Since a printer is paid solely to print, no editorial discretion is
involved in its role and there is no basis for the printer to claim a
direct first amendment right to exclude. 135 As the owner of a medium,
a printer possesses only normal property rights. It can select which
material to accept for publication and which to refuse, but this creates
no control over the copyright; it merely enables the printer to serve a
specialized clientele.
If there ceased to be sufficient marketplace competition and the few
printers or other distributors serving the mass market enjoyed censorial power, then those printers or owners of bookstores, newsstands or
entire integrated distribution systems could presumably be regulated
as common carriers, in a manner similar to the post office, 36 without
abridging any first amendment freedoms. 137 Present economic conditions, however, do not appear to require any such measures. 38
Most periodicals also function as media for the messages of advertisers, 39 in addition to being vertically integrated into the production
132. P. SANDMAN, supra note 42, at 32-33.
THE PRESS IN ENcLAND 1476-1776 (1952) for

See generally F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF
a discussion of access to the press in

England.
133. See L.

LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY:
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 18-87 (1960); P. SANDMAN, supra note 42, at 33-37.

134. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. See notes 55-63 supra and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1970).
The course of events since 1878 has underlined the relevance and importance of the Post Office to our constitutional rights. Justice Holmes in
Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (dissenting opinion),
said that "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the
right to use our tongues. We have emphasized over and over again that
while Congress may classify the mail and fix the charges for its carriage, it
may not set up regimes of censorship over it."
397 U.S. at 251-52. See also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946)
(prohibiting the Postmaster General from acting as a censor). The government can
restrict access to certain materials such as pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976),
upheld in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976),
upheld in United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976).
137. Economic regulation of the print media was not found to violate the first
amendment in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), quoted in note 59
supra. Common carrier regulation of the telephone, telegraph and postal media have
also been accepted by the courts, see note 109 supra. See also the regulation of access
to a cable television system, note 221 infra, as well as regulations of access to live
fora, notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
138. There were, for example, 17,709 bookstores in the United States in 1981,
JAQUES CATTELL PRESS, AMERICAN BOOK TRADE DIRECTORY ix

(27th ed. 1981).

139. "[N]ewspaper publishers are essentially people who sell white space on newsprint to advertisers"; in large part they are only processors of raw materials purchased from others. V. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 379-80
(1961).
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of non-commercial messages. 140 The editing of copyrighted software
written by an editorial staff is clearly protected by the first amendment. 141 As a conduit for commercial advertisements solicited by their
business staffs, however, a periodical appears to be little more than a
print version of a private shopping center and would seem to have
similar rights. 142 In this role it has little claim to a first amendment
right of editorial integrity; 43 the editorial staff is not expressing its
own ideas and readers are on notice that the periodical does not
necessarily endorse the products or services advertised. 4 4 While a
publisher may prove that readers rely on a newspaper to exercise
judgment over which advertisements it will carry, such dependence is
similar to a buyer's assumption that any reputable retailer deals only
in legitimate products. The selection of "products"'' 45 is not a copyrightable action and is not of first amendment "editorial" character.
When acting as a business conduit, a periodical owner is entitled only
to the same rights as a bookstore owner: economic discretion to grant,
46
condition or deny access to message producers.

140. For a discussion of vertical integration see note 54 supra.
141. See notes 55 & 89 supra and accompanying text.
142. "The fact that the publisher handles news while others handle food does not,
, afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with
impunity violate laws regulating his business practices." Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945). As a "paper" version of a shopping center, the advertising department of a newspaper would have the same rights as a private shopping
center owner. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text.
143. Thus, it was acceptable to regulate advertising in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The courts have
recognized that a newspaper is a conduit for paid advertising and for a few other
functions, see note 61 supra. But see note 144 infra for a periodical's derivative first
amendment rights.
144. If the media owner desires to endorse the advertisement it may do so and
assert a derivative first amendment right on behalf of the advertiser, see notes 78-80
supra and accompanying text, but as a medium business owner it has no first
amendment right to exclude those advertisements that it disapproves of. See note 80
supra and accompanying text. Its rights to exclude, in its role as a conduit, are strictly
economic, id., although a media owner does have first amendment rights to disassociate itself from distasteful messages, see note 49 supra.
145. The term "products" includes advertisements, news articles, columns, and
editorials.
146. See Fitzgerald v. National Rifle Ass'n of America, 383 F. Supp. 162, 164
(D.N.J. 1974) ("a newspaper publisher is generally free to contract with whomever
he chooses in the same manner as other businessmen"); America's Best Cinema Corp.
v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (defendant
did not violate the antitrust laws when it refused to accept an advertisement due to,
among other things, a "concern that they would lose their 'family image' "); cf. PMP
Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 597-98, 321 N.E.2d 915, 918
(Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975) (court refused to find The Boston Globe in violation of the
antitrust laws for refusing an ad by an escort service absent evidence of a purpose to
either exclude a person from the market or to accomplish some other anti-competitive
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If competition between periodicals disappeared 147 and the industry
became dangerously oligopolistic, the government could presumably
impose common carrier non-discrimination obligations on a periodical's advertising department 148 similar to those imposed on governobjective). The FTC has said that a newspaper can refuse an advertisement without
violating the antitrust laws whenever it is "acting in accord with the exercise of its
own independent judgment and not in concert with others..." FTC Advisory
Opinion No. 93, 70 F.T.C. 1877 (1966). See 16 C.F.R. § 15 (1974); see also note 45
supra discussing the right of access to newspapers due to their monopoly status; note
62 supra discussing the general right of a property owner to exclude those that it
chooses to exclude.
147. In the newspaper industry there are presently only 26 cities in the nation with
separately owned, fully competitive newspapers. N.Y. Times, June. 18, 1982, at
A18, col. 1. See generally B. OWEN, supra note 3, discussing the economic reasons for
such a situation.
148. For a discussion of common carrier obligations, see note 109 supra; Modla v.
Tribune Publishing Co., 14 Ariz. App. 82, 40 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct. App. 1971) ("[w]e
have no doubt but that the legislature in any situation involving the public health,
safety or welfare can impose reasonable regulation on advertising"); Poughkeepsie
Buying Serv. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 984-85, 131
N.Y.S.2d 515, 517-18 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954) ("[i]t may be that the Legislature has the right to reasonably regulate the newspaper advertising business . . .").
Arguments made by Professor Karst in discussing a hypothetical law that would
require newspapers to accept paid political advertising are applicable here:
The burden on the newspaper's production would be minimal, and
more than offset by advertising revenue. The publisher would be commanded by law to publish something it chose not to print. But: (a) the
government would not identify subjects worth discussing; that choice
would be left to those who seek to advertise; (b) there would be no
government supervision to assure "fair" coverage of any issue; (c) there
would be no regulation of message content; and (d) the publisher could
dissociate itself from any advertising message, both by marginal notations
and by editorial statements. The burden on the publisher's freedom, in
short, is minimal. Against this burden must be weighed the benefits of
such a law in bringing diversity of views to the public.
Karst, supra note 6, at 52 n.165. But see Gore Newspapers Co. v. Shevin, 397 F.
Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1977) invalidating a
requirement that newspapers charge political candidates the lowest local rate available to advertisers; Opinion of the Justices, 362 Mass. 891, 285 N.E.2d 919 (1972),
discussing a proposed Massachusetts statute which would have required newspapers,
which published political advertisements for a candidate for a primary, to offer
access at equal rates to any other candidates or organizations involved in the same
primary. In an advisory opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. See also Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass.
909, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973) (discussing a hypothetical newspaper access statute);
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1968) (right of a publisher to refuse publication of an
advertisement); Comment, Regulation of Commercial Speech: CommercialAccess to
the Newspapers, 35 MD. L. REV. 115 (1975) (commercial access to the press).
A congressional assessment that newspapers were monopolist could lead Congress
to impose a limited right of access on newspapers, especially those governed by the
Newspaper Preservation Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976)). See
Chatzky & Robinson, A ConstitutionalRight of Access to Newspapers: Is There Life
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ment controlled publications.14 The first amendment clearly protects
the periodical owner against unreasonably burdensome regulations
that would threaten its economic viability. 50 Otherwise it would only
protect the owner's editorial integrity by forbidding regulations which
51
interfered with its placement of ads and disclaimers.1
In its role as packager of noncommercial messages, the status of a
periodical is less clear. One might plausibly consider a publisher to be
merely a distributor (especially when it offers a multi-section Sunday
newspaper). This would be the case if one regarded each section of a
periodical as a distinct entity, controlled by an independent department head. The publisher would be serving merely as a common
vehicle for marketing the different packages in a single profitable
product. Under this view, the periodical publisher would enjoy only
normal property rights and would be subject to government regulation. 52 In addition, if its packaging tactics served to frustrate the
viability of other competing periodicals, 1 53 the publisher might be
liable for illegal "tying." '54 There are, however, two reasons for not
treating a publisher merely as a distributor.

After Tornillo? 16 SANTA

CLARA L. REV. 453, 489, 491 (1976). It would seem in fact
that the government would have as much right to regulate a newspaper's classified
section as it did to regulate the shopping center in PruneYard. See note 142 supra.
149. See Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (a state university's campus newspaper which was open to commercial and certain types of public
service advertisements could not reject political advertisements because of their
editorial content); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Poal, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex.
1970) (the Texas Bar Journal, conceded to be an agency of the state, which published
political statements, was prohibited from refusing an advertisement); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (school officials were enjoined from
interfering with the rights of students to place political advertisements in the school
newspaper); Newell, A Right of Access to Student Newspapers at Public Universities,
4 J. C. & U. L. 209 (1977); Note, The State College Press and the Public Forum
Doctrine, 32 U. MIAMi L. REV. 227 (1977). But see Mississippi Gay Alliance v.
Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) (rejection of gay rights advertisement by a student newspaper was permissible since the
mere fact that the university supplied part of the funds for the newspaper does not
make out a case of state action in the absence of university editorial scrutiny).
150. See note 58 supra.
151. See Bazaar v. Fortune, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 995 (1974) (permitting a university to place or stamp a disclaimer on the
cover of a student edited magazine disavowing that it was an official publication of
the university); Karst, supra note 6, at 50-52; note 49 supra.
152. See notes 47-53 supra.
153. If a periodical had potential liability under the Sherman Act it could be a
candidate for at least partial common carrier obligations. See notes 62 & 109 supra.
154. Under the Sherman Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976)), restraints of
trade are banned and monopolization of interstate commerce is unlawful. Id. A seller
may not attempt to condition "his sale of one commodity upon another ... [thereby
coercing] the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the [commodi-
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First, even if the sections of a periodical are actually separate
vehicles for reaching distinct audiences, tying them together into a
single package appears to be dictated by economic necessity; 5 5 usually
it is not financially practical to sell sections separately to readers and
advertisers. Transaction costs are normally too high to permit anything approaching page-by-page offerings 156 although new technologies such as teletext and videotext are beginning to make this possible. 157
Second, a periodical editor could argue that its entire noncommercial content is actually a single interdependent message (similar to a
book) rather than a collection of multiple independent messages. The
direct and active influence of an editor-in-chief over the style, content, depth, and detail of the stories produced by different departments generally insures that the final product has a uniformity, consistency and cohesiveness indicative of a single message. In fact, many
1 58
readers seem to regard the periodical as a single editing service,
distilling vast quantities of interesting and important information into
concise portions that can be digested in a very limited amount of time.
Credibility lost by one department usually affects the public's percep-

ty's] . . .merits and insulate it from the competitive stresses of the open market."
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953). Such an
arrangement is called a tying arrangement and it is considered to "flout the Sherman
Act's policy that competition rule the marts of trade." Id. In Times-Picayune, the
Court held that a publishing company's practice of selling advertising in both its
morning and evening papers but not in either separately was not an unreasonable
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. Id. at 627. For a discussion of the economics of tying, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
1ERFORMANCE 582-84 (2d ed. 1980).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (manufacture of a product in a new
industry may constitute a defense against actions which generally violate antitrust
statutes).
156. Chip Block, publisher of Games Magazine, has experimented with personally
edited editions. Each subscriber to Games was allowed to choose a subset of the
entire set of segments that are offered for each issue. Subscribers were saved the time
and cost of unnecessary pages. Address by Chip Block, Publisher, Games Magazine,
Harvard Business School, Fifth Annual Communications Conference, Jan. 17, 1981.
157. Videotext and teletext systems may be described as a group of information
services ranging from one way transmission of information to sophisticated two way
transmission. J. TYDEMAN, H. LIPINSKI, R. ADLER, M. NYHAN & L. ZWIMPFER,
TELETEXT AND VIDEOTEXT IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1982).
Subscribers to videotext services like CompuServe or The Source may view electronic news at rates of pennies per minute of access. Id. at 55. Any effort to divest
different departments/sections from each other would violate the first amendment if
it destroyed the viability of the medium. See note 58 supra.
158. Owen, The Role of Print in an Electronic Society, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR
ToMoRRow 229, 230 (G. Robinson ed. 1978).
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tion of the entire periodical. 59 As a single message, a periodical would
enjoy full first amendment protection from government regulation of
access to its noncommercial content.
Periodicals receiving government support, such as public school
publications, are affected by the first amendment in two special ways.
First, the amendment prohibits state (e.g., school) officials from exercising editorial discretion over the content of the publication to censor
disturbing viewpoints.160 The only content restrictions that can be
imposed by the state are regulations of scope which are compelled by
a strong government interest.' 6' Second, those delegated as editors
(e.g., students) probably are prohibited from arbitrarily suppressing
views which they oppose.16 2 It appears that courts can require editors
159. Courts have recognized the interdependence of messages in a periodical. See
Homefinder's of America, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 471 F. Supp. 416, 422-23
(D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[d]efendant's decision to reject
plaintiff's advertising ... was sound business judgment ... intended to maintain a
quality advertising section for its readers"); America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort
Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (defendant did not
violate the antitrust laws when it refused to accept an advertisement due to, among
other things, a "concern that they would lose their 'family image' ").
160.
The principles affirmed in Healy v. James, [408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (a
college, acting "as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech
... simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent")] have been extensively applied to strike down every form of
censorship of student publications at state-supported institutions. Censorship of constitutionally protected expression cannot be imposed by suspending the editors, suppressing circulation, requiring imprimaturs of
controversial articles, excising repugnant materials, withdrawing financial
support, or asserting any other form of censorial oversight based on the
institution's power of the purse.
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted). See also
Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (university violated first amendment rights of a student when it expelled her for distributing a newspaper containing
a cartoon which the university deemed indecent); Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722
(4th Cir. 1973) (university violated first amendment rights of editor (and student
author) by disciplining them for publishing a letter offending the university president). Accord Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (D. Md. 1970); Antonelli v.
Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot sub nom. Troy State
Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
161. See note 110 supra.
162. For example, in Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977), the editor of the Mississippi State
University student newspaper-which was partially supported by state fundsrefused to print a paid advertisement and announcement regarding the availability of
homosexual counseling, allegedly because of the editor's distaste for homosexual
activity. In upholding the refusal of the paper to print the Gay Alliance advertisement, however, the court may well have treated the restriction as a valid restriction
of scope (or "type") prohibiting advertisements of illegal activities, see id. at 1075.
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to abide by the same standards of reasonable conduct (i.e., "fairness
doctrine") that presently govern the conduct of librarians and other
school officials. 163
C. Broadcasting: Stations & Networks
Access to broadcast media (both radio and television) has been
difficult to obtain because technological,16 4 economic1 65 and political
factors 16 6 led to the licensing of only a limited number of broadcast
frequencies. Congress could have compensated for this artificial restriction by requiring that broadcast licensees grant common carrier
access to all, 6 7 but after limited consideration this idea was rejected.' 8' Instead, individual station owners were granted discretion
163. "Fair" access could be provided to all by forbidding the editor from excluding
opposing viewpoints in violation of the equal protection clause. See Karst, supra note
6, at 43-52. Courts do not seem unqualified to make these judgments as they make
similar appraisals when teachers and other public employees claim that they have
been penalized for their political views. See notes 120-21 supra; Karst, supra note
104, at 257; Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
DuE L.J. 841.
164. See Levin, supra note 33, at 15-39; Jones, supra note 36.
165. Before the potential for using radio as an advertising medium was acknowledged, "[r]adio was operated as a secondary occupation at best-it was a sideline to
another line of business. Electrical and radio manufacturers and dealers, who early
in 1923 controlled nearly 40% of the country's 576 stations, operated broadcast
outlets as a means of providing entertainment to attract listeners-and thus purchasers of receivers." B. COMPAINE, supra note 3, at 300.
166. The concern about the tremendous political power that could be wielded by
broadcasters was voiced in Congress. In 1926, Rep. Johnson of Texas remarked:
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to
the American people as the radio ....
The power of the press will not be
comparable to that of broadcasting stations when the industry is fully
developed ....
[I]t will only be a few years before these broadcasting
stations, if operated by chain stations, will simultaneously . . . bring messages to the fireside of nearly every home in America. They can mold and
crystallize sentiment as no agency in the past has been able to do. If the
strong arm of the law does not prevent monopoly ownership and make
discrimination by such stations illegal, American thought and American
politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations.
67 CONe. REC. 5558 (1926).
167. "[T]he government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be
shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of
the broadcast day or the broadcast week," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390-91 (1969).
168. In 1926, H.R. 9971 was introduced in the House of Representatives for the
purpose of regulating radio communications, H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 67
CONG REC. 4956 (1926). The existing Federal statutes, Wireless Ship Act of 1910,
Pub. L. No. 262, 36 Stat. 629; Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 238, 37 Stat. 199,
proved inadequate to permit proper administration of existing radio activities with
the enormous increase in the use of radio communications. 67 CONe. REC. 5478-79
(1926) (statement of Rep. White). Only 89 different wavelengths were available and

1982]

FIRST AMENDMENT

205

over programming and Congress compensated those who were denied
access rights by requiring the FCC to serve the "public interest" when
awarding broadcast licenses. 69
a means had to be found "to distribute a limited number of wavelengths among an
unlimited number of stations." Id. at 5479. The bill was passed by Congress in 1927,
68 CONG. REC. 2580, 4155 (1927) and was enacted as the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L.
No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162. The act established the Federal Radio Commission, whose
purpose was to regulate the communications industry by licensing only a limited
amount of stations. 44 Stat. at 1162 (§3), 1163 (§4), 1166-67 (§§9-11).
H.R. 9971 originally contained a provision that would have required a broadcasting station to accept any service which was asked of it without discrimination (i.e.
common carrier status), but this provision was deleted and replaced with a provision
stating that if a licensee permitted one candidate access, it had to provide access to
all. 67 CONG. REC. 12501-05 (1926). The common carrier provision was deleted
because it was felt to be unwise to place a licensee under the hampering control of
being a common carrier. Id. The amendment (in revised form) became § 18 of the
Radio Act. See Pub. L. No. 632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
On April 4, 1934, S. 3285 was introduced in the Senate providing for the regulation of wire communications. S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 5952
(1934). A large portion of the bill consisted of a rewriting of existing radio law and its
amendments. Existing radio laws were to be repealed and replaced by the bill's
provision. The Federal Radio Commission was abolished and replaced by the Federal
Communications Commission. Id. at 8822.
In § 3(h) of the bill, common carrier status was applied to any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire in interstate or foreign communications by wire or radio,
however, such regulation was not to be imposed on broadcasters. No person engaged
in broadcasting was deemed a common carrier. 78 CONG. REC. 10969 (1934). The bill
was passed, id. at 10912, 10995, and enacted as the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
169. Under the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, the licensing
authority shall grant any applicant a license if the public convenience, interest or
necessity (public interest) will be served thereby. Id. at 1166 (§9). Applications for a
license or renewal or modification of license shall be granted if the public interest
would be served thereby. Id. at 1167 (§11). Pursuant to the Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1976)), the FCC
exercises its statutory powers, id. § 303, grants licenses, id. § 309(a), or allows
assignment or transfer of construction permits or station licenses, id. § 310(d), if the
public interest will be served.
In effect, Congress has provided for a public trusteeship of the airwaves, a path
somewhere between common carrier and private ownership. Technically, a trustee is
a person who takes and holds the legal title to the trust property for the benefit of
another. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 3 (1955). The property in question is the broadcasting
spectrum which is said to be an "[i]nalienable possession of the people of the United
States and their government." S. 2930, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REC. 5735
(1924). The government has delegated to the FCC the power to administer the
broadcasting spectrum (by granting licenses for its use) for the benefit of the people.
In administering its trusteeship, the FCC has taken the public interest standard and
applied it to licensees. See Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917,
921 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[a] basic premise of Commission policy is that a licensee is a
'trustee' for the public . . ."). The result has been the evolution of the fairness
doctrine. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
The public interest standard (which had been borrowed from public utility legislation, see Coase, supra note 33, at 8) as embodied in the Radio Act and the Communi-
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In spite of the anticipated administrative difficulties of providing
common carrier access, 170 the normal discipline of the marketplace
cations Act has been recognized as meaning "about as little as any phrase that the
drafters of the Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing
authority," Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as
Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (cited in Coase, supra
note 33, at 8).
The Supreme Court has defined the public interest standard as "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to
carry out its legislative policy." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134,
138 (1940). But according to a recent study of FCC decision makers, the term had a
different meaning to almost every official interviewed. Krugman & Reid, The Public
Interest as Defined by FCC Policymakers, 24 J. BROADCASTING 311 (1980). As former
FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has observed: "use of imprecise language, like
'public interest,' to cover up the total lack of criteria has been said to be 'somewhere
between a charade and criminal fraud,' " Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in
Radio Spectrum Utilization and Allocation, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 505, 517
(1969), quoting Meckling, Management of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968 WASH.
U.L.Q. 26. Congress or the courts must be trusted to spell out objective ways to
measure it, and yet neither has done so. The FCC and the courts have been in
constant disagreement over what standard to apply to achieve the public interest.
See, for example, the controversy over whether giving preference to incumbent
licensees in the license renewal process is in the public interest. Cowles Broadcasting,
Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), reconsiderationdenied, 40 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1627
(1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979), decided on remand, 86
F.C.C.2d 993, 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1138 (1981), afj'd, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 F.C.C.2d (1981); Note, In a
ComparativeRenewal Hearing the FCC May Not Createa Bias in Favorof Renewal,
But Must Use Criteria That Affords a ChallengerA Full Comparison, 47 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1205 (1979).
The nature of the standard appears to leave it undefinable, see Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682-83
(1975), and has led many to call for an articulated quantitative standard for measuring the public interest which would at least avoid the apparently "unpredictable
excessively discretionary" standards being used today, see H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED

FOR A

BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS

53-55

(1962); Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in ComparativeBroadcasting
Licensing Proceedings,24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1971). Nevertheless, the FCC perseveres in its refusal to adopt officially any quantitative program standards. See Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 429 (1977), aff'd sub nom. National Black
Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
170. When the Radio Act was being debated, see note 168 supra, Congress was
concerned with predictions that the imposition of common carrier status would
devastate the broadcasting industry. The idea of unlimited public access, whether
real or imagined, created fears of administrative nightmares. See Note, FCC Authority over Cable Television, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 962, 981-82.
The FRC [Federal Radio Commission], the FCC's predecessor, feared
that thousands of stations would be needed to accomodate all the persons
who would want to state their views on the air and that the interference
caused by so many stations' frequencies overlapping on the spectrum
would injure rather than benefit the listening public.
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quickly led broadcasters to act effectively as such carriers, 7 ' particularly in television. 172 Even today, broadcast television licensees still act
primarily as medium conduits for network programming, 73 although
they are usually vertically integrated 174 into the production of at least
some local news shows. 17 5 As a conduit, a broadcaster does exercise
discretion over the portion of its programming that it does not produce itself, 176 but such discretion is ordinarily limited to the selection
Note, The Listener's Right To Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REV. 863, 896
(1970) (discussing Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., Federal Radio Commission, Third
Annual Report 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930)).
Common carrier status was therefore rejected in part "because of the perceived
lack of wisdom in 'putting the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a
common carrier' and because of problems in administering a non-discriminatory
right of access." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 703 (1979), quoting
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 106 (1973);
see 67 CONG. REC. 12504 (1926). The concern with administratibility is understandable because the Radio Act arose at a time of chaos in the radio industry, see Minasin,
The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920s, 12 J. L. & ECON. 391 (1969).
171. Owen, Structural Approaches to the Problem of Television Network Economic Dominance, 1979 DuKE L.J. 191, 224. Bruce Owen has noted that until quiz
show scandals in the 1950's advertisers and their agencies controlled the content of
network television and entertainment programs. Id. at 223.
172. Id. at 224.
173.
Radio did not originate as an organ of expression and made no claim to
be such. It was seen as a facility somewhat comparable to the telephone
and the telegraph or as a forum where entertainment and debates could be
presented. Initially the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) refused even to
allow radio to editorialize. Though the Supreme Court has confirmed the
broadcaster's right of free speech, broadcasting, or at least TV, continues
to be conditioned by its original function as a facility of dissemination, not
of expression for its owner.
Jaffee, supra note 35, at 785. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 503 n.20, 526-37.
174. In general, vertical integration by networks into broadcasting is constrained
by the FCC's 7-7-7 rules. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (b)(1), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(a)(2) (1981)
restrict a network to the ownership of no more than 7 AM, 7 FM, and 7 TV
(including no more than 5 VHF) broadcast stations.
175. For a discussion of local television news, see BROADCASTING, July 26, 1982, at
37. A broadcast licensee has a statutory duty to offer news of local interest, see 47
C.F.R. § 0.281(9)(8)(i) (1981). One means of serving such interest is the ascertainment and discussion of community problems by the licensee for which the FCC has
developed a primer. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Renewal Applicants, 41 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1381-83 app. B (1976). The primer implicitly recognizes the licensee's involvement in local news programming by permitting
the licensee to discuss ascertained community problems in news programs (presumably produced by the licensee). Id. at 1383. For a discussion of vertical integration
see note 54 supra.
176. The FCC requires that every broadcaster consistently maintain independent
control over selection of all programs as broadcasted as a condition to retention of a
license. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(e) (1981). See National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 199 (1943) ("[a] licensee station does not operate in the public
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of which network to carry rather than involvement in the creative/
editorial process. 177 The former economic discretion is, therefore, not
entitled to either a copyright or first amendment protection.178
Requiring a licensee to honor the fairness doctrine does not violate
its economic rights because that duty is part of its statutory obligation
as a licensee. 79 To the extent the broadcaster is merely selling its
services as a conduit, it cannot claim first amendment exemption from
such access regulation. 80 As long as the government does not violate
the licensee's editorial integrity in its role as program producer, the
first amendment does not even come into play.' 8 '
Presently, government regulation of access in radio broadcasting
appears unnecessary. There is sufficient competition to allow access
for all those who can afford to pay the market price. 8 2 In addition,
the public interest appears to be served by existing format specializa-

interest when it enters into exclusive arrangements which prevent it from giving the
public the best service of which it is capable"; "[t]he licensee is obliged to reserve to
himself the final decision as to what programs will best serve the public interest"). Id.
at 206. See also Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012, 1015 n.6
(5th Cir. 1981), reh'g en banc granted, 662 F.2d 1110 (1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 1033
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983) (No.
82-1185); Cosmopolitan Broadcasting, 59 F.C.C.2d 558 (1976).
177. These programming decisions of private television stations are not subject to
constitutional attack. See Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384
(2d Cir. 1977). They are only subject to review by the FCC when claims are made
concerning abuse of private editorial discretion in violation of the public interest
standards. For a list of such cases see Muir, 656 F.2d at 1025.
178. See notes 55-72 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of a licensee's
obligations under the fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine requires that a private
broadcaster subsidize the messages of those with opposing viewpoints by supplying
reply time free of charge if sponsorship is unavailable. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (citing Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 RAD. REC. (P & F) 895
(1963)). Broadcasters have probably accepted such a tax because the government has
never charged them for their valuable licenses. Broadcasters have fought even the
imposition of a license fee to cover administrative costs. Coase, supra note 33, at 24
(citing 100 CONG. REC. 3783 (1954)). Of course, one reason is that the beneficiaries of
the present policy may have already disappeared, having already reaped their gains.
As Prof. Harvey Levin has noted, the expectations of protected monopoly profits
seem to be capitalized in the sale price whenever broadcast stations and their licenses
change hands. H. LEVIN, supra note 38, at 111-20. Congress has occasionally considered charging broadcasters for their use of the spectrum, but those proposals all have
failed. Coase, supra note 33, at 24. Even FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's proposal for
broadcasters to pay a fee in return for freedom from content regulation has fallen on
deaf ears. See note 36 supra. Thus it must be that the fairness doctrine tax is less than
the tax that broadcasters feel they would be forced to pay.
180. See note 73 supra.
181. See notes 55-63 supra and accompanying text.
182. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 330, 378.
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tion. 183 It is more difficult to gain access to television broadcasting, 84
but the new video technologies may soon remedy this situation.8 5
Common carrier regulation of broadcasters appears to be unnecessary 18 and even noncommercial "public" broadcasters 8 7 are governed
183. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (discussing the best
way to promote the public interest by promoting diversity in radio formats).
184. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 344-48.
185. There are three principal conduits of video media: movie houses, UHF and
VHF television stations and cable (wire) systems. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at
343. Other means for disseminating information, aside from video cassettes and
disks, are emerging. Id. These include wire and broadcast technologies. The broadcast technologies include: (1) Subscription Television (STV), which utilizes traditional VHF and UHF frequencies to broadcast video programming to subscribers
who pay a fee for the service. Id. at 302. Nationwide STV service was approved by
the FCC in Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff'd, National Ass'n
of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970), subsequently modified in No. 21502, 90 F.C.C.2d 341, 51 RAD. REG. 2d
(P & F) 1173 (1982). See 47 C.F.R. §§73.641-44 (1981); BROADCASTING, Aug. 16,
1982, at 33; (2) Low Power Television (LPTV), an experimental technology which
has the potential to provide thousands of new low wattage stations across the country. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 255. The FCC recently solicited applications for
LPTV, see 47 Fed. Reg. 30495 (1982); BROADCASTING, May 17, 1982, at 65; (3)
Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS), which utilizes microwave frequencies to
broadcast programming that can be received by those possessing a special antenna.
HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 304. See Report and Order, No. 19493, 45 F.C.C.2d
616 (1974), as recently modified in No. 80-113, 86 F.C.C.2d 381 (1982); BROADCASTING, Aug. 9, 1982, at 28; (4) Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS), which use satellites to
distribute video programming directly to home rooftop antennas. HousE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 385. DBS was recently approved by the FCC. See Report and Order,
No. 80-603, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1341 (1982); CABLEVISION,
Sept. 6, 1982, at Plus 5.
The wire technologies include cable television as well as the mini version of cable,
master antenna television (MATV), also known as satellite MATV (SMATV).
SMATV operators receive broadcast signals and distribute them by wire but operate
entirely on private property (such as apartments and condominiums). BROADCASTING,
June 21, 1982, at 33. See New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982). There is also the possibility of video distribution by telephone
companies. See Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 209, 241-57 (1982).
Still, if broadcast licenses are no longer "exclusive" it is difficult to understand why
they continue to be so valuable. See BROADCASTING, April 5, 1982, at 36. In fact, the
price of a license may be as high as $220 million. BROADCASTING, April 5, 1982, at 36.
But see the proposal by Mark Fowler to tie removal of most broadcast regulation to
broadcast fees, discussed in note 36 supra.
186. Due to the emergence of the new video technologies discussed in note 185
supra, broadcasters claim that they lack the monopoly power that would justify
common carrier regulation. See note 109 supra. In fact, they now argue that access to
video distribution channels is as easily available as is access to printing presses and
thus they are seeking repeal of the fairness doctrine. See note 5 supra; Krasnow &
Robb, Telecommunications and the 94th Congress: An Overview of Major Congressional Actions, 29 FED. COM. L.J. 117, 162 (1976). Congress has considered several
bills that would do just that. See, e.g., S.2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 211
(1975); S.22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 539 (1977); S.622, 96th Cong.,
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1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4652 (1979). See The Future of Content Regulation in
Broadcasting, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 565-66 (1981).
If the video broadcast medium is truly competitive then competitive pressures
alone would be enough to insure that broadcasters served the public interest. If
sufficient options are available, viewers can use their dollars and time to vote for
programs, as they do for other goods (including products of the print media) and
choose whatever they deemed to be in their own interest. Some claim that paternalism requires that the government pressure viewers into watching some programs that
might be ignored by them because of lack of information. See Barrow & Manelli,
Communications Technology-A Forecast of Change Part II, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRons. 431, 444-45 (1969). Such influence, however, could be accomplished with
direct subsidies of programming by the government (e.g., the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting), but see Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting From Unconstitutional
Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719 (1980), or by private foundations. For example, the
Benton Foundation will give millions to the electronic news media, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 6, 1980, at 27. Although some meritorious works may still fail to receive
funding, this problem is tolerated in the print media today and would seem equally
tolerable in broadcasting.
Some fear that if the fairness doctrine were repealed, and time was allocated
according to marketplace bidding, the wealthy would gain complete control of the
media, but this is not true. As Ronald Coase has noted:
resources do not go, in the American economic system, to those with the
most money, but to those who are willing to pay the most for them. The
result is that, in the struggle for particular resources, men who earn $5,000
per annum are everyday outbidding those who earn $50,000 per annum.
Coase, supra note 33, at 19. Thus, a weekly half-hour news show in New Bedford
and Fall River, Massachusetts is presently fully supported by advertisers who wish to
reach the significant Portuguese audience. BROADCASTING, Dec. 1, 1980, at 2. Interestingly, much of the so-called public interest programming is already being produced by private parties acting in their own profit seeking interest although the pay
networks would require STV delivery. See note 210 infra for a listing of many such
offerings.
Ted Turner's Cable News Network and the Westinghouse-ABC Satellite News
channels are providing 24-hour-a-day news, see CABLEVISION, Sept. 13, 1982, at Plus
16. Continuous local news is aired over cable in more than 100 locations, see Wall St.
J., Jan. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6. Gavel-to-gavel coverage of the Senate has been proposed, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 95, and with cameras now allowed into the
courtroom, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), there is another source of
dramatic programming. Culture networks are being offered to adults, BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 48. Children's programming advocates have highly praised the
Nickelodeon channel of Warner Amex that provides 13 hours per day of high quality
children's programming. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1979, § 4, at 20, col. 3; 125 CONG.
REC. 18994 (1979). Educational channels are also being planned, aided by the 10year $150 million gift of Walter Annenberg for college programming. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1981, at C26, col. 5. Even esoteric subject matter like ALI-ABA's
continuing legal education courses are being offered. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1980, at
6, col. 2. Showtime has even given Ralph Nader his own show. BROADCASTING, Jan.
12, 1981, at 7.
Corporations would also be able to air programming which they believed to be in
the public interest. Although their right to do so is now clear, First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), most companies have been unable to secure air time
due to the broadcasters' fears of costly legal battles at license renewal time. See, e.g.,
Kaiser Aluminum's continuing battle with ABC. BROADCASTING, May 5, 1980, at 8;
id., Aug. 11, 1980, at 47; id., Feb. 16, 1981, at 48. Mobil has also been frustrated, id.
Feb. 11, 1980, at 9; id., Apr. 21, 1980, at 56. See also FCC STAFF, REPORT ON CABLE
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only by fairness doctrine access requirements.18 8 Satellite owners seem
to be the only broadcasters treated as common carriers. 89
TV

CROSS OWNERSHIP POLICIES 47 n.38
STAFF REPORT] recognizing this problem.

(Nov. 17, 1981) [hereinafter cited as FCC
Such litigation arises when those opposing
the corporation's viewpoint file petitions to deny renewal of the broadcaster's license
charging it with giving an unbalanced view of the issue presented, in violation of the
fairness doctrine. This fear has existed since the WTOP case, as noted in an editorial,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1980, at 154, and nullifies increased interest broadcasters
have expressed to accept issue advertising. BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1980, at 106. See
also id., Mar. 2, 1981, at 73; id., May 26, 1980, at 52. For a discussion of the need for
corporate viewpoints see Banks, The Rise of the Newsocracy, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan.
1981, at 54.
187. Licenses for noncommercial educational FM broadcast stations are granted
only to nonprofit educational organizations upon a showing that the station will be
used for the advancement of an educational purpose. 47 C.F.R. § 75.503(a) (1981).
There is a similar regulation for noncommercial educational television stations, 47
C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (1981). Such television broadcast stations may transmit only
educational, cultural, and entertainment programs. Id. at § 73.621(c).
188. The fairness doctrine, as codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1981), is made
applicable to noncommercial educational broadcast stations by 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.503(d), 73.621(e) (1981): "the Government cannot control the content or
selection of programs to be broadcast over noncommercial television any more than it
can control programs broadcast over commercial television." Community-Service
Broadcasting v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 204-06 (1943) (radio licensees required to
exercise discretion independent of national networks); Writers Guild of America,
West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Calif. 1976), vacated and remanded, 609
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (first amendment violated
where FCC, national networks and professional associations jointly pressured local
stations to set aside a "family hour" for programming suitable for viewing by children)). Accord Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); City of New York Mun. Broadcasting Sys., 56
F.C.C.2d 169 (1975). This premise led a District Court to void as unconstitutional 47
U.S.C.A. § 399 (West Supp. 1982), which prohibited editorializing by certain noncommercial educational television and radio stations, League of Women Voters v.
FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The decisions by two public broadcasters
to reverse initial decisions to broadcast the controversial movie "Death of a Princess"
has created some controversy. In Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 662 F.2d 1110 (1981), af'd, 688
F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 8,
1983) (No. 82-1185), the court held that
[u]nder the Communications Act, both public and private broadcasters
are licensed by the FCC to serve the public interest as public trustees ...
[A licensee must] insure that the public is presented suitable and varied
social, political, and aesthetic ideas and experiences. . . . [T]he manner in
which those obligated functions are discharged has to date been left to the
editorial discretion of the licensee, whether public or private.
656 F.2d at 1017.
The court went on to note, however, that the discretion exercised by the broadcaster would not violate the first amendment. The court then twice emphasized that
"the district court's finding . . . that AETC's decision was based on its view of the
public interest, namely a concern for safety of Alabama citizens in the Middle East
has not . . . been shown to have been clearly erroneous.
... Id. at 1023 (paraphrasing itself at 1019). A Texas District Court decision, Barnstone v. University of
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Access rights to the new media technologies will depend on how the
government allocates the right to use them. If licenses are allocated
through the marketplace, then media owners will be treated as print
publishers.9 0 If, however, licenses are awarded according to nonmarketplace criteria and qualified applicants are turned away, then
there would be an inherent right of access to those without licenses. 11
This right might be satisfied by imposing a fairness doctrine on the
licensees. 192
The issue of access to the airwaves does not end with a review of
access to broadcast transmitters; it is also necessary to examine the
question of access to broadcast networks. Past FCC policies have
resulted in the emergence of three dominant television9 3 networks
which fill the lion's share of television broadcasters' time.

Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980), holding to the contrary was reversed,
660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981); the reversal was upheld by the Fifth Circuit en banc,
688 F.2d 1033 (1982).
189. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.103(c)(2) (1981). Yet on August 17, 1982, the FCC
authorized DOMSAT licensees to sell transponders on their satellites on a noncommon carrier basis, finding that the potential benefits outweighed the danger of
anti-competitive action. Domestic Fixed Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 F.C.C.2d
1238, 52 RAD. REC. 2d (P & F) 79 (1982). For a detailed summary of the commission's
domestic satellite policies, see Orbit Deployment Plan-Domestic Satellite, 84
F.C.C.2d 584 (1981); Domestic Fixed Satellite Service, 88 F.C.C.2d 318 (1981). See
also Botein, New Communications Technology: The Emerging Antitrust Agenda, 3
CoMM/ENT L.J. 685, 696-97 (1981); Botein, Jurisdictionaland Antitrust Considerations in the Regulation of the New Communications Technologies, 25 N.Y.L.S. L.
REV. 863, 873-78 (1980) (recognizing the general status of satellites as common
carriers).
190. Where there is marketplace allocation for ownership of a medium (as in the
print media), there does not appear to be a government obligation to provide
compensatory access. See notes 36, 42 & 48 supra. If such a practice is used for the
new technologies, the author advocates the use of funds to purchase access for nonlicensed speakers.
191. Where licenses are distributed according to non-marketplace criteria, nonlicensees have a right of access. See notes 37-40 & 43-44 supra.
192. The fairness doctrine has been imposed in broadcasting (where licenses are
allocated according to non-marketplace criteria) to satisfy the rights of non-licensees.
See notes 15-20 supra.
193.
Past Commission policies have served effectively to limit television to a
system dominated by three over-the-air advertiser-supported networks
....
In each case, the Commission limited the ability of new networks to
enter and sacrificed the potential improvement in network competition in
order to achieve some other goals. In no case have these other goals been
realized.
Executive summary to 1 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL REPORT: NEW
TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION at 5-6
(1980).
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Broadcast networks act primarily as conduits for the distribution of
advertising and the programming that will attract an audience for the
advertisements. 9 4 They are also usually vertically integrated into the
production of such programming. 95 In their role as conduits, they
have no first amendment rights to exclude advertisers. If they attempt
to frustrate advertiser access, the government presumably could impose regulations providing access. 11
The constitutionality of such access regulations would depend on
whether the networks were providing a single interdependent message
(with full first amendment protection from government interference)

194. "During the entire history of network radio entertainment, and during the
first decade of network television, program decisions were made, not by the networks
themselves, but by advertisers and their agencies." Jencks, How Network Television
Program Decisions Are Made, in NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37
(Botein & Rice ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Jencks]. The FCC soon became terribly
concerned that advertiser influence was responsible for deficiencies in network programming, see Federal Communications Commission, Public Service Responsibility
of Broadcast Licensees ("Blue Book"), reprintedin F. KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 132-216 (3d ed. 1978); for a more detailed discussion of the Blue
Book, see Fisher, ProgramControl and the Federal Communications Commission: A
Limited Role, 14 VILL. L. REv. 602 (1969); Meyer, "The Blue Book," 6 J. BROADCASTINC 197 (1962), and for this reason among others the television networks were
encouraged to take charge of program selection. Jencks, supra, at 37-39. For a more

detailed discussion of the era see E.

BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR: NOTES ON A MODERN

(1978).
195. In Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 495 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
a group of non-network producers attacked this vertical integration, claiming that
the decisions of the three major networks to produce all news and documentaries inhouse violated the antitrust laws, but the claim was dismissed. Even NBC chairman
Grant Tinker has criticized network involvement in program decisionmaking.
BROADCASTING, June 14, 1982, at 58, col. 1. For a discussion of vertical integration,
see note 54 supra.
196. Thus, the Justice Department brought suit against two major networks for
violating the Sherman Act by monopolizing prime time entertainment programming,
United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 459 F. Supp. 832 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
But see Fastow, Competition, Competitors and the Government's Suit Against the
POTENTATE 32-58

Television Networks, 22

ANTITRUST BULL.

517 (1977). In 1965 the FCC proposed a

"50-50" rule which would have required that, for at least 50% of its schedule, a
network would have to return to the role of merely selling time to advertisers and
others. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, No. 12782, 45 F.C.C. 2146, 2164 (1965).
It should be noted that the decision in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) held only that advertisers did not have a first
amendment right of access greater than that provided by the fairness doctrine, see
note 22 supra and accompanying text. In fact, such access has been legislated by the
access rules for political candidates. See notes 25 & 52 supra. For a discussion of the
FCC's jurisdiction over the networks see Davidson, Extension of the Federal Communications Commission's Jurisdiction to the Television, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 235
(1981-82).
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or a set of independent messages.19 7 Measured audience flow 9 8 and
the character of specialized format radio networks'"9 appear to support the former, but a careful review of how a single network's daily
schedule is established supports the latter.
Individual programs are clearly protected as single messages by the
first amendment. Even if independent producers produce and retain
ownership of the copyright, a network can assert derivative first
amendment rights to prevent the government from interfering with its
broadcast.20 0 This protection, however, does not extend to the network in its role of tying together different and distinct programs (each
protected by a different copyright).
A network might claim that an entire evening's offerings were
actually a single message, but single television programs do not seem
to be interdependent in the same way that sections or even issues of a
periodical are. Many, if not most of the broadcast television audience
seem to treat them as independent messages. One program's message
does not seem to taint or otherwise compromise the editorial credibility of another. 20 ' As long as the government does not interfere with
individual television programs, the program producer's absolute first
amendment rights would appear to be adequately protected. It appears that treating programs as individual units is also economically
viable, as advertising rates are already differentiated 20 2 and pay-per20 3
view television appears to be profitable.

197. This is analogous to the question in the print media discussed at notes 152-59
supra and accompanying text.
198. Audience flow is the phenomenon of viewers' staying tuned to the same
channel unless they have a definite reason to switch. E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NoWHERE 93-100 (1973). Audience flows are very valuable to broadcasters, see id.;
Owen, supra note 171, at 226.
199. For a discussion of specialized radio formats see FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
200. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
201. The credibility of a broadcaster or a network's individual news programs,
however, is undoubtedly affected by each other. See Gertz, The Influence of Researcher Methods on Television and Evaluations, 25 J. BROADCASTING 155 (1981).
202. Program producers seem to treat individual programs as separate entities; the
variable structure of advertising rates reflects the demographics of the diverse and
disjointed audiences which their programs attract. The use of ratecards is an example
of such treatment. Ratecards set a different advertising rate for each program that

has a significantly different Nielsen rating. See SRDS

SPOT TELEVISION

RATES

(monthly periodicals published by Standard Rate and Data Service). This is in
contrast to the predominantly uniform rates normally charged print media advertisers for reaching a single audience. See Editor and Publisher, supra note 33, passim.
203. Pay-per-view programming means that viewers pay for each pay cable program they view. Baldwin, Wirth & Zenaty, The Economics of Per-Program Pay
Cable Television, 22 J. BROADCASTING 143, 143 n.3 (1978). For a discussion of the
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Decisions concerning the positioning of programs within a week or
an evening certainly require tremendous skill. These decisions, however, are business judgments. 20 4 Even the most brilliant evening
lineups do not earn a network executive a new copyright and the first
amendment does not protect them .205
If the government were to impose common carrier non-discriminatory access obligations upon a network during particular time periods,206 the only protection that the first amendment would provide
would be a guarantee that the network be permitted to disclaim any
association with those programs that it disapproved of in order to
protect its editorial integrity. 207 The fifth amendment would supplement that right by guaranteeing the network that it received just
20 8
compensation for its valuable time slots.
While it would appear constitutional for the government to require
networks to sell time slots in a non-discriminatory manner, 20 such
access regulations seem unnecessary with the emergence of dozens of
new satellite distributed programming networks.2 10 Access to networks will probably be available at competitive rates. Moreover, the
benefits of permitting networks to specialize by serving diverse audiences appear to outweigh the danger that discretionary power may be
used for anti-competitive ends.
economics of pay-per-view programming see id. Presently it has been used primarily
for prize fights. See Multichannel News, Oct. 5, 1981, at 36, 33, col. 1; id., June 21,
1982, at 5, col. 1, but its potential for offering opening nights of first run movies is
even more exciting. See Harmetz, Hollywood's Video Gamble, N.Y. Times Maga-

zine, March 28, 1982, at 40; Baker, Nail by Nail,

CABLEVISION,

March 1, 1982, at

Plus 15. There is also the potential for offering college concerts, Multichannel News,
March 29, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
204. See notes 55-63 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
206. The first amendment seems to apply to such regulations in the same way as it
does to the prime time access rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1981), which prohibits the
broadcast of more than three hours of network programming between the hours of 7
p.m. and 11 p.m. local time. Id. That rule was upheld against a first amendment
challenge in Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971)
("the prime time access rule, far from violating the First Amendment, appears to be a
reasonable step toward fulfillment of its fundamental precepts . . ."). See also National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 53538 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding a modified version of the rule).
207. See note 49 supra.
208. Under the fifth amendment, private property (e.g., property rights in broadcast time slots) cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
209. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
210. For a list of most of the more than four dozen networks now in operation, see
BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 48; CHANNELS, Nov./Dec. 1982, at 17, 20, 22, 40, 41
(Field Guide Supplement).
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The application of the first amendment to public broadcasting
networks remains to be litigated, but it appears that such networks
would have the same obligations to act evenhandedly (without supporting or suppressing viewpoints arbitrarily) in the same manner as
publicly funded print publications or those awarding government
21
grants. 1
D. Wirecasting: Telephones, Telegraphs & Cable Television
Telephone and telegraph companies merely own and operate the
wires and switches used to transmit messages and thus have no first
amendment rights to exclude the messages of others. In fact, both are
subject to economic regulation as common carriers.2 12 American Telephone & Telegraph is presently denied even the first amendment right
to disseminate its own messages over its lines because of the potential
213
for anti-competitive behavior.
Cable television system owners are similarly situated and also lack
special first amendment rights to exclude others. The cable operator
enjoys only normal economic property rights. 214 As economic rights
they are subject to federal access regulation 21 5 and any access provisions that a state may impose or a locality may negotiate during the
franchising process. 2 6 They do not have the character of constitu211. In Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963
(D.C. Cir. 1977) the court held that a complaint against the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting on first amendment grounds was not frivolous. See Canby, supra note
104; Note, supra note 186.
212. 47 U.S.C. §153(h) (1976). See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358
U.S. 334, 349 (1959).
213. See the consent decree between the U.S. Justice Dept. and AT&T, U.S. v.
Western Electric, 552 F. Supp. 131, 180-86 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
214. See notes 47 & 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
215. The FCC extended the fairness doctrine and equal time access compromises,
47 C.F.R. § 1212 (1981), from broadcasting to cable television in First Report and
Order, No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209

(1981)) but the agency has not sought to enforce them. See
BuREAu, FCC,

CABLE TELEVISION

THE 1980
22 (1981).
Cable operators are also subject to the rules on mandatory signal carriage ("must
carries"), which require them to give free access to all "significantly viewed" local
broadcast stations, 47 C.F.R. § 76.51-.65 (1981). "Significantly viewed" is defined by
a percentage of viewing hours per week. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(k) (1981).
216. For a discussion of public access requirements see Meyerson, The First
Amendment and The Cable Television Operator: An Unprotective Shield Against
Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 1, 2 n.10, 12-14 (1981). But see two
suits filed recently charging that state and local public access regulations violate the
first amendment. Comax Telcom Corp. v. State of New York Comm'n on Cable
Television, No. 82-CV-746 (N.D.N.Y. filed July 19, 1982); Century Cable of N. Cal.
v. City of San Buenaventura, No. 82-5274 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 12, 1982).
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE POLITICAL BROADCASTING LAWS:

ELECTION EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
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tional rights, whose surrender may not be conditioned on the grant of
21 7
government privilege.
Should operators appear to have excessive market power over program producers/suppliers, they could conceivably be prohibited from
entering the video publishing field. 21 8 So far this has not been the
217. While the government is not required to grant a franchise license to a cable
television operator, it cannot condition receipt of that license on acceptance of
conditions which could not otherwise be constitutionally imposed. See Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("a person may not be
compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963) ("liberties of religion and expression may [not] be infringed by the denial
or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"); Frost Trucking v. Railroad
Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) ("[i]f the state may compel the surrender
of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence"); Illinois Broadcasting
Co. v. Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 454, 238 N.E.2d 261 (App. Ct. 1968) (a municipality
can condition the grant of a cable franchise upon the provision by the cable operator
of public access and privacy protections).
218. When a cable operator is vertically integrated into program production there
exists a danger that it may favor its own affiliated services over those of its competitors. See WHITEHEAD REPORT, supra note 54, chap. II, at 12, 20; J. Ordover & R.
Willig, Notes on Non-Price Anti-competitive Practices By Dominant Firms, presented at the ninth annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Annapolis, Md., Apr. 1981; In re Teleprompter Corp., 87 F.C.C.2d 531, 578, 49 RAD. REG.
2d (P & F) 1631, 1662 (1981) (Fogherty, Comm'r, dissenting). There seem to be a
number of examples of such practices.
Cable News Network (CNN) challenged the purchase of Teleprompter (now
Group W Cable) by Westinghouse, claiming that the new vertically integrated
company intended to exercise its market power to exclude CNN from the Teleprompter systems in favor of the Westinghouse/ABC Satellite News Channels, but the FCC
discounted the dangers of anticompetitive practices. 87 F.C.C.2d, at 554-63, 49 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) at 1647-52. Nevertheless, CNN has threatened an antitrust suit,
Multichannel News, Jun. 28, 1982, at 4, col. 1. It appears that Group W may have
acted this way by excluding HBO from systems soon after purchasing 50% of the
Showtime movie network, see HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 297. In apparent fear
that this could happen again, Viacom conditioned its repurchase of Showtime from
Group W on a guarantee that Showtime would remain on Group W systems for at
least 5 years. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1982, at D4, col. 5. Finally, the cable system
owners who share ownership of the Spotlight movie network have been substituting
it on their systems to the detriment of HBO, Cinemax, and The Movie Channel. See
Multichannel News, July 19, 1982, at 11-61, col. 5; id., Aug. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
Although the FCC denies the harmful possibilities of such vertical integration, FCC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 186, at 115-25, this conclusion appears to be flawed, see
Noam, supra note 185, at 213-14; FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 186, at 111, where
the agency itself recognizes the critical assumptions on which these conclusions are
based.
Monopoly power can also be exercised through tiering practices. Tiers are bundles
of channels, see Multichannel News, Sept. 14, 1981, at 40, col. 1, and are now
created at the discretion of the cable operator. Although they may be attacked as
illegal tying, see United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962), they may be saved by
their economic necessity under the standard of United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp.,
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case.2"" Absent common carrier treatment, 220 the system operator has
the right to select which programs and services to offer. If, however, it
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1969), discussed in
note 155 supra, as long as it is prohibitively expensive to bill for each service
individually, see Besen & Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Mandatory Leased
Channel Access for Cable Television 30-31, 78-79 (Dec. 1982). By structuring the
tiers of channels, a cable operator can put its own programming in the most favorable position (benefiting from cross-subsidies at times) while keeping its competitors
in the least favorable tiers. See The Buffalo Shuffle: TMC Gains, HBO Loses 27,000
in Channel Shift, Multichannel News, Sept. 14, 1981, at 40, col. 1.
The 1971 Sloan Commission, the 1974 Presidential Cabinet Committee, and the
1976 House Subcommittee cable reports all recommended a strict separation of
programmer and cable operator as soon as it was economically practical. See SLOAN
COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUN-

142 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN REPORT]; WHITEHEAD REPORT, supra
note 54, at chap. III, at 1-4; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE

DANCE

COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CABLE TELE-

VISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE 90 (subcomm. reprint 1976)

[hereinafter cited as HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT]. See also F. POWLEDGE, AN ACLU
GUIDE TO CABLE TV 32 (1972) (expressing the ACLU's support of strict separation);
K. Kalba, Separating Content From Conduit? (Kalba Bowen Assoc., Cambridge,
Mass. 1977) (a comprehensive discussion of strict separation); FCC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 186, at 1-38 for a shorter view of strict separation.
219. Cable television operators face competition from the new technologies, as
discussed in note 185 supra. For some appraisals of intermedia competition see Reidy,
An Economic Perspective: The Business of Communicating, CHANNELS, Nov./Dec.
1982, at 4-6 (field guide); Noam, supra note 185, at 233-41; Moozakis, SMA TV: Your
Business or Theirs?, CABLE TELEVISION BUSINESS, Nov. 15, 1982, at 35-44; Holsendolph, Tougher Times for Cable TV, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
Legislation prohibiting vertical integration is particularly unlikely in light of the
present deregulatory mood of Congress and the FCC. In fact, Congress is presently
reexamining the restrictions on vertical integration between television broadcasters
and networks, discussed in note 174 supra, see BROADCASTING, Dec. 20, 1982, at 56,
and the Justice Department has hinted that it is considering the repeal of the
Paramount consent decree, discussed in note 220 infra. See Justice Department Press
Release, Oct. 21, 1981.
220. Proposals for treating cable television as a common carrier were frequent in
the early 1970's because, as economist Bruce Owen noted, they would allow "the
carrier to take advantage of economies of scale in the transmission process, and at the
same time provide an opportunity for considerable competition among message
sources ..
" Owen, Public Policy and Emerging Technology in the Media, 18 PUB.
POL'Y 539, 546 (1970). See F. POWLEDGE, supra note 218; Besen & Johnson, supra
note 218, at 1-2.
The FCC also has recognized the merits of common carrier status for cable. In
1970 it requested comment on a proposal that more than half of the channels of large
cable systems be leased at reasonable, non-discriminatory rates. Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970). The New York Public
Service Commission also considered the possibility, see W.K. JONES, REGULATION OF
CABLE TV BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 199-201 (1970)
(proposal by Commissioner Jones for cable systems to evolve into common carriers).
The FCC rejected a full common carrier model in 1972, finding it premature,
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 197 (1972), as had the Sloan
Committee, SLOAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 148. Subsequently the WHITEHEAD
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REPORT, supra note 54, chap. IV, at 2, and HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 218,

at 90, both agreed that the imposition of common carrier status should be delayed.
The FCC's decision, meanwhile, was upheld in the courts against a challenge by the
ACLU, see ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
The FCC did adopt a limited common carrier plan which required systems to
provide some special free-access channels, 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a)(1)-(3) (1979) (repealed 45 Fed. Reg. 76,179 (1980)), and one leased access channel, id. § (4), with a
provision for additional leased access channels when all of its present leased channels
were "in use during 80 percent of the time during any consecutive 3-hour period for 6
consecutive weeks." Id. § 4(d). Nevertheless, these regulations were struck down in
FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689 (1979), when the Supreme Court held, in a 6-3
decision, that such common carrier regulations were beyond the scope of the FCC's
power. After reviewing the history of the Communications Act, the Court found that
§ 3(h) of the Act unequivocally prohibited the FCC from treating broadcasters as
common carriers. Id. at 704. The statute specifically provided that "a person engaged
in radio broadcasting shall not. . . be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. §153(h)
(1976). Although Congress does have the power to legislate such a structure its
actions in this regard have been unsuccessful, see S.2653, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., 105
CONG. REC. 18486 (1959); S.1044, 87th Cong. 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 2516 (1969);
H.R. 7715, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., ll CONG. REC. 8751 (1965); H.R. 12914, H.R.
13286 and H.R. 14201, 89th Cong. 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 3348, 4886, 7364
(1966).
In the absence of FCC jurisdiction and congressional action, common carrier
status may be imposed by states or localities. The late Governor Rockefeller asked
New York State to try it, Note, Common CarrierCA TV: Problems and Proposals, 37
BROOKLYN L. REV. 533, 549 (1971), but to date no states or localities appear to have
adopted it. Some have felt that localities have not favored such proposals because
they have been more concerned with treating cable systems as sources of general
revenues than with guaranteeing access, see Botein, CATV Regulation: A Jumble of
Jurisdictions, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 816, 819 (1970); Clarification of Cable Television
Rules and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 176, 181 (1974).
It appears that public interest groups may also prefer to receive implicitly subsidized
free access to cable systems than to pay explicitly for a leased channel.
Cable operators generally oppose common carrier treatment for four reasons.
First, it would deprive them of control over which program services they carried, a
right they claim as "electronic publishers," see notes 223-37 infra and accompanying
text. Second, it would deprive them of the power to fix the consumer prices of their
programming services which they may presently do without violating the Sherman
Act's prohibition against price fixing, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Third, they fear that
common carrier status would facilitate the establishment of rate regulation, see FCC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 186, at 127-40. Finally, they normally link common carrier
treatment to a prohibition against vertical integration by operators into programming. It should be noted that such a prohibition, discussed in note 218 supra, is a
separate issue from the imposition of common carrier status. See, e.g., Nadel, COMCAR: A Marketplace Cable Television Franchise Structure, 21 HARv. J. ON LEG.
(forthcoming May 1983), for a proposal of a cable television franchise structure
which would treat cable operators as common carriers, not require rate regulation
and permit operators to vertically integrate.
If cable operators do not act affirmatively to assure all interested parties that
leased channels are available on a non-discriminatory basis, they may well be subject
to the same type of divestiture suit (divesting them of their programming interests) as
was brought by the Justice Department against movie theater owners in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (divesting theater owners of their
film studios), or recently settled against AT&T (divesting the company of its local
monopoly operating companies). See remarks of Assistant Attorney General William
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is granted the exclusive right to serve a franchise community (whether
expressly de jure or effectively so) the first amendment, 22 1 if not the
antitrust laws,2 22 would require that some form of access be available
to those denied licenses.
Baxter, CABLEVISION, Jun. 28, 1982, at 79. Bernard Wunder, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Communications and Information has predicted that "leased channels
are the future of the cable industry." Grudgel, Leased Channels Conference Held,
National Federation of Local Cable Programming Newsletter, Nov./Dec. 1982, at 1.
See also Huffman, Pressure Grows for Law Requiring Leased Access, Multichannel
News, Mar. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (describing desire for law requiring leased access).
221. If franchise licenses are truly only de facto exclusive licenses, i.e., they are
available to all qualified applicants, see, e.g., note 235 infra, then there would
appear to be no more of an inherent first amendment right of access to cable channels
than to newspaper columns, see note 45 supra. Where, however, a de facto exclusive
license is effectively de jure (because a municipality refuses to grant additional
franchise licenses, even to qualified applicants) then there is some inherent constitutional right of access to the cable channels. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. City
and County of Denver, No. 82-1738 (D. Colo., filed Nov. 1, 1982), discussed in N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1982, at A18, col. 1; CABLEVISION, Dec. 13, 1982, at Plus 5-11; note
44 supra.
It seems inconceivable that the Supreme Court would permit this right of access to
be manifest in the form of a fairness doctrine, enforced by the municipality, although
such an FCC imposed standard was accepted in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See text and accompanying notes 15-25 supra. Those
decisions appeared to rest upon the technological limitations of the broadcast medium. See notes 14-20 & 31-34 supra and accompanying text. In the cable medium,
with its inherently unlimited channel capacity, the Court would more likely require
that a reasonable number of public access and/or leased channels be mandated by
some government body. But see note 216 supra.
222. In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982),
the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not exempt from the antitrust laws
unless a state specifically grants them. an exemption. Absent state legislation, the
question remains as to what effect the antitrust laws will have. See Comment,
Alternative Approaches to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 51
(1982). Cable operators denied franchise licenses might charge unprotected municipalities with unreasonable restraint of trade. The operators may claim that by
denying access to public rights of way, municipalities are fostering monopolization of
"essential facilities," Henderson, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television: Some
Issues and Problems, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 667, 670-72 (1981). An essential facility is
one which cannot be duplicated by would-be competitors and foreclosure to such a
facility is an illegal restraint of trade. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). A number of new dual franchises have recently been awarded in apparent reaction to Boulder, see Narrod,
Boulder Verdict, Renewals May Increase Overbuilds, Multichannel News, May 3,
1982, at 49-57, col. 1, but most cable operators feel that dual franchising benefits
neither of the competing companies and thus the cable brotherhood has almost
unanimously stayed true to the unspoken code opposing overbuilds. Companies seem
to fear that to encroach on someone else's territory is to invite retaliation. Dawson,
How Safe Is Cable's 'Natural Monopoly'?, CABLEVISION, Jun. 1, 1981, at 333;
Narrod, supra.
Cable operators may also be prone to suits from programming networks seeking
access. See Channel 100, Toledo, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision Corp., No. 80-40071
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Cable television franchise owners analogize their position to print
media publishers, 22 3 claiming equal first amendment rights. This comparison, however, is somewhat deceptive.224 If a cable operator vertically integrates and establishes an editorial/production department to
produce operator-originated programming, then that editorial department clearly has the same first amendment rights as any other
message producer; but a cable operator cannot claim that its simultaneous transmission of independent networks comprises a single message. Programming on one channel does not taint the editorial credibility of the others.
A cable operator's selection of which networks it will carry will
certainly affect its business reputation and future earnings, but such
business judgments are not of first amendment character. 225 They do
not earn the operator a copyright nor do they prohibit economic
regulation. As long as the operator is permitted to operate under an
economically viable structure, 22 6 and protect its editorial integrity by
disclaiming any association with any networks that it finds distasteful,22 7 it cannot claim any more first amendment protection. The
amendment does not provide it with any more of a right to exclude
others from its channels than the amendment provides television set
producers a right to adjust their sets to exclude228channels that they
feared would harm their reputations and profits.
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (preliminary injunction restraining cable operator from terminating plaintiff's access to cable channel), discussed in BROADCASTING, May 19, 1980, at
76; notes 45 & 137 supra.
223. See Goldberg, Ross & Spector, supra note 5. In the final stipulation and
judgment in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, No. 80-M-62 (D.
Colo. Oct. 29, 1982) (Stipulation & Judgment) the parties stipulated that the cable
operator was "a First Amendment disseminator," id. at 5, although the court found
that "[n]o evidence in the record and nothing within the stipulation indicates a need
for unique rules and standards to govern the application of the First Amendment to
cable television." Id. at 9-10.
224. This analogy is suggested because localities normally do not distinguish between the award of a license to build and operate cable franchise hardware and the
right to determine the programming. Repeated commingling of the roles creates such
a confusion, but to see that they are not necessarily tied one need only recognize that
such roles are separated in both the satellite and telephone industries due to common
carrier regulations, see Kreiss, supra note 4, at 1011. Still, the analogy is repeated by
many, see, e.g., note 5 supra.
225. They are mere economic rights. See notes 47 & 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
226. While the government is prohibited from imposing regulations that threaten
the economic viability of a medium, see note 58 supra, a common carrier structure
like that suggested in Nadel, supra note 220, would not violate that prohibition. The
structure would not require rate regulation nor foreclose a cable operator from
leasing its own channels.
227. See note 49 supra.
228. It would be equivalent to a printer claiming a first amendment right to
control its competitors' contents because of their effect on its profits and thus viabil-
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Operating an entire cable system, even if consisting of only twelve
channels, 22 9 is also very different from publishing a single newspaper
or magazine in another way. The cable operator's control over multiple channels makes it more analagous to the operator of the presses
and newsstands used by twelve different periodicals serving a single
locality. 230 Unlike a single publisher or broadcaster, the cable operator
is able to stifle direct competition among a large number and percentage of the media outlets in its market segment, 2 3 1 both in terms of
content 232 and price. 3 3 As the natural monopolistic characteristics of
distribution23 4 almost always prevent a second cable operator from
entering a market (even though cable franchise licenses are rarely de

ity. "[T]he First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from
broadcasting on 'their' frequencies ....
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
229. Currently, almost half of all systems have more than 12 channels and 12% of
them have more than 30 channels. See Besen & Johnson, supra note 218, at 111.
230. Ownership of the 100-plus channel systems that are promised for Boston,
Dallas, Denver, Montgomery County, Maryland and Sacramento, California, see
BROADCASTING, Nov. 15, 1982, at 35, will be equivalent to owning the presses for 100plus periodicals serving a single locality.
231. This would be so even if the relevant product market includes all of those
media mentioned in note 185 supra.
232. See HoUsE REPORT, supra note 3, at 354 ("it is legitimate to ask the extent to
which emerging competition is undermined by permitting a single cable operator to
retain program control over the major proportion of . . .[video] outlets [in a market]").
233. Its position as monopsonist buyer (i.e. sole seller, P. SAMUELSON, supra note
3, at 549) and monopolist seller of video programming distributed over the cable
medium allows the operator to set all prices without violating the Sherman Act's
prohibition against price fixing, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which would forbid the actual
distributors of programming (networks) from discussing their pricing practices with
each other.
234. See Comanor & Mitchell, Cable Television and the Impact of Regulation, 2
BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. 154, 171-74 (1971); Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable
Television, Columbia University working paper No. 430A (Oct. 20, 1982), both
presenting data supporting cable's natural monopoly status. Still, in Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd sub nom.
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandursky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970), the
court declared "CATV is not a natural monopoly." Id. at 657. In Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455
U.S. 40 (1982), Chief Judge Markey, in dissent, claimed that "the city's sole defense is
to pretend disingenuously and contrary to the extensive, uncontradicted testimony
and the findings of the trial judge. . . that cable is a natural monopoly." Id. at 712.
Even if cable distribution were not a natural monopoly, the limited availability of
space for pole attachments and underground ducts in many communities would
preclude competitive entry by cable systems, see Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable
Television, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 607, 622-23 (1981). See also Dawson, supra note 222
(noting that almost all cable operators seem to believe that a franchise is a natural
monopoly).
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jure exclusive) ,235 there is a strong case for divesting a cable operator
of control over its channels by imposing non-discriminatory common
carrier obligations upon it. As a common carrier it would operate very
amendment
much like a publicly owned system, 236 with the same first
237
forum.
public
a
operate
to
status as others delegated
VI. Conclusion
The theory of the first amendment discussed above distinguishes
between the rights of the two groups comprising our system of communication: "hardware" medium owners and "software" message
producers. First amendment rights belong solely to the latter-those
who edit software messages which are normally entitled to copyrights.
The amendment absolutely protects their thinking and editing (inclusion and exclusion of messages). If the expression of their message does

235. Localities normally award only a single franchise license, see Johnson &
Blau, Single Versus Multiple-System Cable Television, 18 J. BROADCASTING 323
(1974). Competitive franchising (known in the industry as "overbuilding") is usually
limited to municipalities which are juxtaposed to franchises controlled by different
companies and presently exists in only about a dozen franchises out of more than
4,000. Only those in Allentown, Pa., and Phoenix, Ariz., are of appreciable size. See
FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 186; Dawson, supra note 222; Narrod, supra note
222.
The right of the city to grant a single de jure exclusive license is unclear. Such
licenses have been prohibited in some states, Dawson, supra note 222, and a California court has held that the California State Constitution precludes such monopolies
in the field of communications. See TM Cablevision v. Daon Corp., No. 15067 (San
Diego Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1981), discussed in BROADCASTING, Jan. 12, 1981, at 69. Still,
a survey of New Jersey franchises in 1972 found that 8 of 66 had explicitly granted
exclusive rights to install cable. Leone & Powell, CATV Franchisingin New Jersey, 2
YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACT. 252, 258 (1972).
236. 'Municipal ownership of cable television systems has been advocated by
many, see, e.g., R. JACOBSON, MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
(1977); Comment, Community Antenna Television: The Case For Municipal Control, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 99 (1975); Comment, Toward Community Ownership of
Cable Television, 83 YALE L.J. 1708 (1974). Nevertheless, public ownership has its
problems also, see Henderson, supra note 222; Synchef, Municipal Ownership of
Cable Television Systems, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 205 (1978). Cambridge, Mass., and
Cleveland, Ohio, are presently seriously considering the option, see Multichannel
News, Feb. 1, 1982, at 7, col. 1; id., Dec. 6, 1982, at 25, col. 1. Statistics on 28
municipally owned systems are presented in MacKenna, The Cabling of America:
What About Municipal Ownership?, 70 NATIONAL CIvIC REV. 307, 311 (1981).
237. See, e.g., libraries, Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v.
Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982), discussed at note 121 supra; public theaters, Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), discussed at note 105 supra;
publicly owned periodicals, discussed in notes 160-63 supra and accompanying text;
and public broadcast stations, discussed at note 188 supra. See generally note 107
supra.
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not conflict with some other constitutional value then the government
238
may not impose unreasonable restrictions on their access to media.
The owners of the media are not entitled to any direct first amendment protection, although they may assert rights of inclusion on behalf of those who use their media. The owner's rights to include and
exclude messages are solely economic property rights. These permit
them to select which messages will gain access to their media.2 3 9 If,
however, their economic power becomes great enough to enable them
to censor messages and/or the advantages of permitting them to exer2 40
cise discretion is minimal, then the government may regulate access
and even impose common carrier obligations upon them.

238. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), discussed
in notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
239. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), discussed at notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text.
240. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), discussed at
notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.

